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This two-essay dissertation aims to study institutional logics in the context of 
Apple’s independent third-party software developers. In essay 1, I investigate the 
embedded agency aspect of the institutional logics theory. It builds on the premise that 
logics constrain preferences, interests and behaviors of individuals and organizations, 
thereby determining the appropriate and legitimate decisions and actions of actors. In 
the meantime, most social actors operate in fields characterized by multiple 
institutional logics where contradictions exist, allowing individuals and organizations 
with opportunities for negotiation and change through exploitation or management of
these contradictions. I specifically study two competing institutional logics: 
professional and market logics when they are experienced simultaneously by
independent iOS app entrepreneurs. Using participant observation and semi-structured 
interviews, I delineate the ways in which logic tension is reconciled through 
mechanisms of logic synthesis in three entrepreneurial areas –app ideation, app 
execution and app marketing, and conditions which facilitate or inhibit logic synthesis. 
In essay 2, I study the emergence and evolution of field-level logics in the 
context of Apple’s desktop developers –Mac indies. Following the cultural 
emergence model of field-level logics in Thornton et al. (2012), and the argument that 
“field-level logics are both embedded in societal-level logics and subject to field-level 
processes that generate distinct forms of instantiation, variation, and combination of 
societal logics” (p148), I particularly examine the relationship between resource 
environment and the emergence and evolution of field-level logics. Taking advantage 
of a critical change in developers’ resource environment –Apple’s opening of the iOS 
App Store and subsequently the Mac App Store, and hence its governance model 
shifting from mainly a technological platform to a platform that includes a market 
exchange place, I identify developers’logics before and after the change, namely, the 
software ecosystem logic and platform ecosystem logic. Two ideal types are 
constructed for the logics along elemental categories, and a content analysis 
demonstrates the logic shift pattern as resource environments change. A further 
analysis of the two logics suggests that the software ecosystem logic and platform 
ecosystem logic are in contestation at this early stage of institutional change.
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Essay1: On Synthesizing Professional and Market Logics in Nascent 
Entrepreneurship: A Study of iOS App Entrepreneurs
Abstract
Research in institutional logics indicates that professional and market logics are two 
competing institutional logics which often lead to conflict due to differences in their 
key attributes such as sources of legitimacy, norms and definitions of success. In this 
paper, we study how these conflicting logics are experienced simultaneously by 
independent application (app) developer entrepreneurs on the Apple App Store. 
Subsequently, we investigate how these app entrepreneurs resolve these conflicts 
through a process of logic reconciliation that we term logic synthesis. Using a 
practice-based qualitative approach, we identify the logic anchors for a set of app 
developers on three entrepreneurial areas –app ideation, app execution and app 
marketing. Subsequently, we identify the key processes by which app developers find 
ways to resolve the conflict between market and professional logic within these 
entrepreneurial areas so that they may achieve a balance between the two logics at the 
level of the entrepreneurial area, i.e., achieving logic synthesis. Since synthesis does 
not occur in isolation, we also identify and discuss a key set of factors that hinder or 
encourage the process of synthesis. Using a set of interviews and field work 
methodology, we provide a nuanced model of logic anchoring and synthesis in the 
context of the nascent entrepreneur on the App Store, thereby contributing to the 
literature on institutional logics, platform ecosystems and nascent entrepreneurship.
Keywords:  independent application developers; institutional logic; qualitative 
research; nascent entrepreneurship; platform ecosystems
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1. Introduction
The software development industry has undergone many transformational 
changes in the last decade as platforms and customer needs have evolved. The latest 
transformation in this industry is the emergence and growth of the app economy, 
characterized by small applications that are developed specifically to be implemented 
on mobile or hand-held platforms and sold through virtual retail platforms 
(MacMillan, Burrows and Ante 2009, Wasserman 2010), the most popular of which is 
the Apple App Store. The App Store has been credited with revolutionizing the mobile 
apps consumption and production market by “democratizing” digital innovation 
(Boudreau 2012, Yoo et al. 2010). Specifically, the App Store has allowed 
independent software developers (“indie” developers) to enter the marketplace for 
apps by providing access to customers that were previously available only to larger 
and more established firms. In effect, the introduction of the App Store has allowed 
nascent app entrepreneurs who have identified the needs of niche segments to directly 
reap the benefits of their innovative activity. 
Nascent entrepreneurs are defined as those individuals who decide to commit 
their own time and resources to founding a new firm in the form of a start-up (Wagner 
2007). This represents conception, the first stage of a four-stage entrepreneurial 
process, of which the other stages are gestation, infancy and adolescence. Using this
definition, many of the indie developers who offer apps on the App Store are nascent 
entrepreneurs since their firms are usually founded by 1-2 persons. These indie 
developers perform all the activities related to software engineering, including 
software design and development, quality assurance and security in order to meet App 
Store’s criteria for quality and functionality. At the same time, they are also 
responsible for strategically positioning their apps in the marketplace, reacting to 
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competition and marketing their apps effectively. In effect, app entrepreneurs are 
required to handle the business practices needed to be competitive in the marketplace 
as well as the software engineering aspects of application design and development. It 
is often the case that the market demands are in conflict with the statutes of software 
development and design principles for such indie developers. Indeed, this conflict is 
enshrined in the ideal type construction of professional and market logic proposed 
within the institutional logics perspective (Thornton 2002, 2004, Thornton, Ocasio 
and Lounsbury 2012). A natural question arises –if such conflicts from contrasting 
logics are systematic in the environment that these app entrepreneurs operate in, how 
then do they resolve these conflicts on an ongoing basis? This central question forms 
the focus of this paper.
The theory of institutional logic builds on the premise that society consists of a 
set of interdependent and yet contradictory institutional logics and is rooted in seminal 
work by Friedland and Alford (1991), followed by Thornton and her colleagues (1999, 
2002, 2004, 2005, 2012). These logics include logic of the family, community, 
religion, state, market, profession and corporation. These logics dictate actions and 
decisions that are considered legitimate and rational, depending on the context of a 
particular institutional order. Understanding these logics is important because of the 
two levels of influence they wield on social actors (firms, individuals or collectives). 
First, logics constrain preferences, interests and behaviors of individuals and 
organizations, thereby determining the appropriate and legitimate decisions and 
actions of actors. Second, most social actors operate in fields characterized by 
multiple institutional logics where contradictions exist (Dunn and Jones 2010, Yeow 
and Faraj 2011), allowing individuals and organizations with opportunities for 
negotiation and change through exploitation or management of these contradictions. 
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Building on this literature, in this paper we focus on the dynamics between logic 
of the profession and logic of the market in particular, and examine how they both 
shape and are appropriated by indie app developers on the Apple App Store. On one 
hand, app developers follow the professional logic rooted in software engineering 
principle as well as the accepted norm of user-directed innovation in the software 
profession (Von Hippel 1986). The focus here is on developing apps that meet their 
own needs and provide the most elegant or satisfying engineering solutions, 
regardless of cost or revenue implications (Wasserman 2010). On the other hand, the 
logic of the market within the App Store requires developers to be highly responsive 
to the platform owner’s control in the market place and the extremely competitive and 
volatile market environment, wherein the focus is on adaptation to platform policies, 
first-mover advantages, operational efficiency, and an emphasis on customer needs. 
Clearly, these two competing logics experienced by individual nascent entrepreneurs 
on the App Store create “conflicting pressures on their cognitive and behavioral 
capacities” (Thornton et al. 2012, p. 57), which need to be reconciled in a systematic 
manner (Jain, George and Maltarich 2009, Eikhof and Haunschild 2007, Tschang 
2007). 
Our study delineates the antecedents and the processes by which this logic 
reconciliation is achieved. We build on the argument that particular circumstances 
experienced by individuals will trigger different goals and schemas and shape their 
behaviors (Thornton et al. 2002, Ross and Nisbett 1991). Our work here also answers 
the call issued by Thornton et al. (2012) for more research at the individual-
institutional-field levels. To that end, we conduct a qualitative study of app developers 
in the Mid-Atlantic region and address the following research objectives. First, we 
identify what attributes constitute professional and market logic for app developers 
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and how these logics are manifested in app developers’ specific entrepreneurial 
practices. Second, we identify factors that influence the manner in which app 
developers reconcile conflicting logics as part of their working process. Finally, we 
identify the specific processes that app developers use in managing logic conflict. 
From our qualitative data, we are able to provide a richer and more comprehensive 
model of logic conflict and reconciliation carried out by app developers on the fast-
moving, competitive App Store.
Our study contributes to the institutional logics literature in three significant ways. 
First, we delineate specific attributes of the professional and market logic in the 
context of App entrepreneurs. The conceptualization of market logic here is 
particularly interesting. Because the App Store market is created and governed by 
Apple as the platform owner, the instantiation of market logic and its implications for 
legitimacy and strategic behavior by app developers differs considerably from 
descriptions of market logic seen in the literature where there is no such central 
controlling figure (Thornton 2001, 2002, 2004). Thus, our description of market logic 
is a marked departure from extant literature and is rooted in contexts where software 
platforms dominate (Parker and van Alstyne 2008).
A second contribution of our work is to identify contexts where professional logic 
is not sacrificed in favor of market logic. Most of the extant literature on dynamics 
between professional and market logic emphasizes the notion that in the presence of 
conflict, professional logic tends to lose out to market logic. However, it is possible 
that some agents sacrifice elements of market logic in favor of professional logic in 
order to attain success. In the App Store context, we observe that both logics influence 
individual practices, and that conflict is reconciled in both directions. We term this 
“logic synthesis”, a more balanced view of interaction between market and 
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professional logic that does not start with the bias of one-directional movement from 
professional to market logic yet allows a more expansive discussion of antecedents of 
logic reconciliation. Our study also advances theorizing on the microfoundations of 
institutional logics (Thornton et al. 2012) by describing how the presence of multiple 
logics trigger and enable individual behaviors and practices on the App Store. 
Finally, our work contributes to the literature on nascent entrepreneurs 
(Davidsson and Honig 2003, Baron and Ensley 2006) by studying a growing area of 
nascent entrepreneurship, i.e., app entrepreneurs. Through our qualitative approach, 
we identify three major types of tasks that app entrepreneurs engage in, and provide a 
more nuanced analysis of how logic synthesis strategies are developed for each of 
these tasks as these entrepreneurs move from conception to gestation and infancy 
(Wagner 2007). We start with a review of the relevant theoretical arguments in 
professional and market logic in the next section.
2. Theoretical Background –Conflicts between Professional and Market logic 
and Logic Synthesis
Institutional logic is broadly defined in the literature as “the socially constructed, 
historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by 
which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time 
and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, p. 
804). In other words, institutional logics provide acceptable and legitimate guidelines 
for behavior for entities within societal, organizational or individual contexts. The 
literature has examined varying competing logics such as the logic of religion, 
corporation and market, which act on individuals or groups depending on the context. 
Logics are characterized by a set of factors such as the sources of legitimacy, signals 
of authority and the existence of unifying norms, each of these help identify the 
specific logic (Thornton 2004). In this paper, we specifically address the competing 
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logics that manifest in the context that we study –professional and market logics, and 
their conflicts.
Conflict between professional and market logic has been examined in the 
literature at societal, organizational and individual levels. At the societal level, prior 
work has used a typology of logic ideal types to describe how factors such as sources 
of legitimacy, authority, identity, norms, strategy and economic systems vary between 
market and professional logics (Thornton 2004, Thornton et al. 2012). At the 
organizational level, Thornton (2001, 2002) argues that professional logic emphasizes 
personal capitalism with a focus on factors such as personal reputation, personal 
networks and organic growth. Alternatively, the market logic here revolves around 
market capitalism, where market position, corporate structure, acquisition growth and 
capital committed to market return are emphasized. Different firms may choose 
different elements within these contrasting logics but in many cases, the industry 
tends toward market logic as the dominant logic over time (Thornton 2002).
At the individual or small group level, these logics are individually manifested in 
professions that use economic value as legitimizing factors versus professions that use 
alternative (often artistic) values as legitimizing factors. Conflict is driven more by 
organizational and individual identity and less by alternative forms of capitalism. For 
example, Bourdieu’s (1990) theories of artistic and economic logic in practice contend 
that “the economic logic of practice is followed when individual benefits are gained 
from exchanging goods and services via markets, such as product markets, capital 
markets or labor markets. In comparison, artistic logic of practice is marked by the 
desire to produce art for art’s sake, where art is an abstract quality that surfaces in 
specific aesthetics or individual reactions by the recipient, and needs no external 
legitimization” (Bourdieu 1990, Eikhof and Haunschild 2007, p. 526). Because of the 
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contradictions embedded in these two contrasting logics, interactions between 
individuals subscribing to one of these two logics tend to engender conflict. In 
documenting the 1996 Atlanta Symphony Orchestra Strike, Glynn (2000) shows how 
musicians embrace artistic creativity and excellence as symbols of success, while 
management and the Board consider financial return as success, leading to conflict. In 
a different context, Nag, Corley and Gioia (2007) examine the attempt by a high-tech 
R&D organization to transform into a market-oriented organization by grafting new, 
non-technological knowledge. Extant knowledge in the firm is driven by scientists 
and engineers possessing a pure technology-push mentality focused on developing 
cutting-edge technology, often without an obvious commercial application. In contrast, 
the new knowledge that was grafted in the organization is represented by executives 
who take a market-pull orientation and aim to make the organization market-driven 
and customer focused, thereby creating conflict in the firm. 
When conflicting logics are experienced by the same individual, negotiations 
between the two logics undergo a more intricate process. In the microfoundations 
model of institutional logics, Thornton et al. (2012) argue that “humans have multiple, 
loosely coupled, and often contradictory social identities and goals. Specific social 
situations and interactions shape which social identities and goals get triggered. And 
individuals learn multiple contrasting and often contradictory institutional logics 
through social interactions and socialization”(p. 80). Applying this argument to the 
dynamics between professional and market logic suggests that when both logics are 
available and accessible to individuals, the logic that is more salient depends on the 
immediate situational characteristics. Furthermore, how individuals deal with the 
inherent conflict between professional and market logic is affected by social 
interactions with others and the socialization that follows. The literature shows that 
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professionals indeed vary in the degrees to which they are susceptible to making 
changes induced by the market logic. For some, professional identities and norms are 
more salient even though adapting to the market logic could bring in monetary 
benefits. For example, Stern (2004) shows how scientists pay a compensating 
differential to participate in science. Studies on open source software suggest that 
many developers contribute to writing software out of intrinsic instead of extrinsic 
motivations (Roberts, Hann and Slaughter 2006, Shah 2006). Alternatively, other 
professionals choose to reconcile the two logics to reach a logic balance (Lampel, 
Lant and Shamsie 2000, Tschang 2007). This is especially observable when 
professionals establish business based on their domain knowledge and expertise, or 
when they experience career transitions. Their role identity may change as skills, 
behaviors, and patterns of interaction adapt to meet the demands of the new role (Jain 
et al. 2009, Ebaugh 1988, Louis 1980). 
Professionals reconcile competing logics through different methods. One method 
involves revising their beliefs and behaviors, sometimes involuntarily. For instance, 
Eikhof et al. (2007) document how German theatre artists invest extensive effort in 
strategic networking (a market logic strategy) to ensure positions in future plays as a 
response to idiosyncratic and subjective staffing decisions by stage managers. While
gaining job security, artists compromise part of their artistic passion for economic 
benefits. A second method involves not significantly compromising on professional 
logic but acquiring elements of market logic to achieve balance. Nag et al. (2007)
show that rather than adopting practices championed by business development and 
marketing professionals, R&D engineers and scientists adapted a previous technology 
problem into a market problem they could solve. However, they preserved their 
professional identity while addressing the logic conflicts through modified 
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professional knowledge practice. Finally, collaboration to acquire market logic can 
also accomplish logic reconciliation. Jain et al. (2009) show that professors involved 
in technology transfer activity delegate commercialization activity to those who 
possess related skills while preserving cherished values associated with being an 
academic. 
Taking this argument one step further, we also find some evidence for when 
market logic is compromised in favor of professional logic. Voronov and De Clercq 
(2007) study the Ontario wine industry where success could be driven by both 
commercial strategy and a degree of artistic and authentic appeal. The authors find 
that in many cases, the dominant logic is one emphasizing artistic authenticity while 
concealing their practices on the commercial aspects of the business. Many vineyard 
owners sacrifice market logic to gain professional logic under some circumstances.1 A 
similar fluidity of identity and logics was observed in Elsbach and Flynn’s study 
(2008) of toy designers in a large US corporation, where most designers defined their 
creative approach as being “flexible” rather than being excessively market-driven.
These arguments imply that it is likely that professionals in fields with a strong 
market and engineering logic may use two approaches to logic balance: one where 
professional logic will be sacrificed in pursuit of market logic, and the other where 
professional logic will still dominate but may have elements of market logic grafted 
on. As it is possible for professionals within the same profession to have diverse 
identities, similarly it is conceivable that logic balance may be achieved from either 
end-point of the continuum, which is a significant deviation from extant literature. 
Building on these arguments, we propose a working definition of logic synthesis for 
achieving logic balance. We propose: For logic synthesis to occur, it is necessary to
                                                            
1 The paper positions these contrasts under the framework of Bourdieu’s (1993) “field of large-scale 
production” (FLP) versus “field of restricted production” (FRP).
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concurrently consider both logics of the profession and of the market. The process of 
logic synthesis can occur from either focal logic in an individual facing logic tension. 
Logic synthesis therefore involves focal logic compromise, opposite logic extension, 
or both, such that a balancing point can be found where the best proportion of the two 
logics is achieved for the individual in the specific context. 
3. Research Methods
Given the limited theory pertaining to app entrepreneurs’ motivations, strategies 
and processes available in the literature, we chose to study logic synthesis through an 
inductive, ethnographic study, with a focus on entrepreneurs’ actual practices 
(Orlikowski 2000, Schultze and Orlikowski 2004, Levina and Vaast 2005, Levina and 
Vaast 2008). Inductive studies are especially useful for developing theoretical insights 
when research focuses on areas that extant theory does not address well (Ozcan and 
Eisenhardt 2009). The ethnographic approach is especially effective in grasping the 
culture of an emerging group of population in an open-ended manner. It is therefore a 
good fit for the research questions at hand. 
We restrict our sample to include developers who have published at least one app 
on the App Store. Since we are interested in nascent entrepreneurs, we focus only on 
those who build bootstrapped ventures with no external financing support. This can 
include either full-time or part-time businesses. We exclude hobbyists who publish 
apps on the App Store only for fun and not for revenue-generating purpose. Since the 
thresholds to publishing an app on the App Store are low, entrepreneurs with 
heterogeneous technical backgrounds and logics are present. The potential to attract 
entrepreneurs identifying with both professional and market logics concurrently 
makes the mobile app industry well-suited to studying logic synthesis in a cross-
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sectional manner, as opposed to prior work that studies logic shift over time in a focal 
industry (Thornton 2002).
Data collection for the study began in November 2009 from multiple data 
sources: field and online observations, semi-structured interviews as well as 
participant observation for triangulation. Over 90 hours of field observations were 
conducted in the 2009-2011 time-period. In addition, the first author attended multiple 
Mac and iOS developers’ meet-ups and events for mobile entrepreneurs in the Middle 
Atlantic Region. During these visits detailed field notes were taken on developer 
presentations and interactions. The meet-ups provided a rich understanding of the 
ecosystem around the app developer community in addition to access to specific app 
entrepreneurs who were then identified as potential interview candidates. In total, 26 
face to face semi-structured interviews were conducted with 19 app entrepreneurs. 
Each interview, lasting between 1 to 2 hours, was recorded and transcribed. Extensive 
memos were taken during the transcribing process. Resources such as company 
websites, blogs, user forums and Facebook fan pages of the 19 entrepreneurs were 
examined for triangulation. Theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss 1967) was used 
when choosing new participants in order to maximize variant instances of the two 
logics and synthesis practices. The first author also conducted participant observation 
through a 10-month internship at an iOS mobile software company. Through day-to-
day work activities and interactions, a deeper understanding of the lifecycle of a 
mobile app and the decision-making process of developers was gained. This 
experience was used to validate internal and face validity of the model developed 
(Adler and Adler 1987). Table 1 provides an overview of all collected data.
Our analytic approach followed an iterative process of theory development and 
analysis. The analysis consisted of three steps: first, we identified major areas that an 
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app entrepreneur needs to make decisions on during the development and marketing 
of an app. After drawing up a list of identified practices, we condensed the set of 
entrepreneurial activities into three stages that echo extant literature: app ideation, app 
execution and app marketing. Given that app development is a form of new product 
development, the first two stages are consistent with the rational plan perspective of 
the new product development process, which maintains that “a product that is well 
planned, implemented, and supported by senior management will be a success” 
(Brown and Eisenhardt 1995, p. 348). These two stages are also consistent with the 
literature on where interactions between the two logics occur (Voronov et al. 2007, 
Baron et al. 2006, Tschang 2007, Nag et al. 2007, Lampel et al. 2000, Glynn 2000) 
which shows that logic conflict occurs especially during period of conceiving a new 
idea and the stage of delivering a product, a service or a performance. Additionally, 
the literature has addressed the need for specific forms of marketing practices in the 
context of software products (O’Mahony and Bechky 2008, Meeteren 2008) that 
warrants the inclusion of app marketing as the third stage of entrepreneurial activity. 
We discuss these three stages in detail later in the paper.
During the second stage of the analysis, our goal was to identify factors that 
shape professional and market logic for indie developers, based on information 
provided by the developers during the interviews. As part of this stage of analysis, we 
aimed to identify the dominant logic anchor for each developer on the three 
entrepreneurial stages identified above. Thornton et al. (2012) argued that individuals 
have multiple and often contradictory goals and therefore can dynamically access 
conflicting logics according to specific situations. Building on this argument, we do 
not presuppose that developers will display the same dominant logic anchor across all 
three entrepreneurial stages but allow these to differ, thereby departing from the strict 
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ideal-type approach observed in the logics literature (Thornton 2002, 2004). Thus our 
unit of analysis is the entrepreneurial practice rather than the individual. We 
iteratively identified the logic anchor and the corresponding practices through careful 
cross-developer and cross-entrepreneurial activity analysis, as well as an examination 
of similarities and differences in logics and practices (Miles and Huberman 1991). 
In the third phase of analysis, we coded app entrepreneurs’ logic synthesis. 
Whenever entrepreneurs conveyed a sense of change, shift, integration and 
compromise related to either of the two logics, we coded these as synthesis practices. 
We also concurrently developed working hypotheses about factors that drive or inhibit 
logic synthesis in any given situation. We constantly compared the emerging themes 
and hypotheses in subsequent data collection, analysis and extant literatures. 
Gradually, our codes reached a level of saturation where they were mutually exclusive 
and comprehensive (Miles and Huberman 1991). At the conclusion of the analysis, we 
arrived at the theoretical model, shown in Figure 1, incorporating the three 
entrepreneurial stages of activity, the two competing logics and synthesis practices. 
We discuss these findings in more detail next.
4. Findings
We first describe the general environment shaping professional and market 
logic for indie app entrepreneurs. Then we discuss the two logics enacted by app 
entrepreneurs within the three entrepreneurial areas. The structure and examples of 
this discussion are shown in Table 2. Next, we discuss the factors that inhibit logic 
synthesis. Lastly, we describe in detail the factors that promote logic synthesis in 
addition to specific processes of synthesis observed in our fieldwork and interviews. 
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4.1. Factors Shaping Professional and Market Logic for Indie App 
Entrepreneurs 
The manifestation of professional logic in the indie app community is driven by 
factors similar to those observed in the software engineering profession. These 
include a focus on user-led innovation, training in software engineering principles and 
an emphasis on peer recognition. Software developers like to tinker and work on 
hobby projects at their spare time, similar to user innovators in open source 
communities who enjoy the freedom and creativity inherent in picking their own 
projects to work on (Von Hippel 1986, Shah 2006). Working on their own projects 
enables developers to avoid time pressures present in organizational projects where 
task deadlines exist and “shortcuts” may be adopted (Austin 2001). While personal 
interest determines what the developer chooses to work on, software engineering 
training dictates how the developer goes about writing this software. The IEEE 
Computer Society’s Software Engineering Body of Knowledge defines software 
engineering as the “application of a systematic, disciplined, quantifiable approach to 
the development, operation, and maintenance of software” (Abran, Moore, Bourque 
and Dupuis 2004:1-1). In addition, a focus on quality metrics, such as performance, 
capability, usability, and reliability (Kekre, Krishnan and Srinivasan 1995) become 
integral to professional logic. When consumer-oriented software is developed, issues
related to software aesthetics (how the application looks, feels and sounds) (Garvin 
1987) as well as user interface design become crucial, and hence relevant to 
professional logic, particularly for developers on the App Store since Apple is known 
for its emphasis on app graphics. Finally, an important element of professional logic is 
legitimacy that accrues from the peer community. Like many professional groups, 
such as editors and artists, where peer recognition and approval denote achievement 
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and status (Thornton 2002, Elsbach et al. 2008), the developer community values
meritocracy and status attainment through community recognition (O’Mahony et al. 
2008, Stewart and Gosain 2006). 
In comparison to professional logic, factors shaping market logic for indie app 
entrepreneurs stem from two sources - fundamentals of market-based economies as 
well as App Store-specific market conditions. The fundamental elements of market 
logic in most market-based economies include developing customer and market 
knowledge, a focus on solving customer problems (Nag et al. 2007, Baron et al. 2006), 
understanding and managing budgets and financials (Glynn 2000, Nag et al. 2007), 
generating positive cash flow and operating within acceptable levels of risk (Baron et 
al. 2006). 
The more profound impact on market logic here however, comes from the App 
Store environment. In a marketplace with around 700,000 apps (AppShopper, 
accessed October 2012), indie developers face tremendous competition on the market. 
Furthermore, the additional level of control exerted by Apple as the platform owner 
strongly influences market logic. Like owners of other software platforms, Apple 
develops the operating system and provides the software development kit (SDK) and 
APIs for third-party developers. What is different about Apple is that it also owns the 
exclusive distribution channel: the App Store. Thus, as a gate keeper, Apple 
determines which apps can be sold through its review process. While reviewing is 
intended primarily for quality assurance, at times it is also enacted for political 
reasons, leading to the process being perceived as inconsistent and nontransparent2. In 
direct contrast to the negative fallout from the review process, the platform-designed 
top charts and promotion features on the App Store help boost apps’ sales 
                                                            
2 http://techcrunch.com/2009/07/27/apple-is-growing-rotten-to-the-core-and-its-likely-atts-fault/
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tremendously. Thus, app entrepreneurs enacting market logic are acutely aware of 
these App Store-specific levers and actively incorporate them in their entrepreneurial 
decisions, described next.
4.2. Professional and Market Logic Practices within Entrepreneurial Areas
App Ideation: Personal Needs vs. Mass Market Needs
App developers’ practices and selected quotes in accord with professional and 
market logics in the three entrepreneurial areas are presented in Table 2. In the app 
ideation phase of the entrepreneurial process, developers make decisions on the types 
of applications to be developed and features to be included. A recurring theme from 
developers who identify with professional logic is the choice to write software that 
fulfills their own needs or relates to their own passion. In our interviews, 
entrepreneurs state that when they work on familiar domains or on apps they 
personally need, they tend to use the app more often and constantly improve it. 
Specifically, developers design the user interface they are satisfied with, create the 
flow of the app that best matches their use habits and also improve the innate 
engineering quality of the software by finding and fixing bugs since they interact with 
the apps frequently. 
In contrast to serving personal needs, strategies aligned with market logic focus 
on developing apps with a mass market appeal. The rationale is that these apps are 
more likely to achieve wide adoption and subsequently climb onto top charts, which 
feed more downloads. App developers influenced by market logic also spend 
considerable time keeping track of the top-chart apps and researching current apps on 
the platform; using this information to drive the choices of apps they develop. Some 
developers would also practice “copycatting,” i.e., learning from and mimicking 
existing hit apps. On the App Store, it is common to see “cheats” and “walkthroughs” 
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for top-ranking games, and apps with deceivingly similar names and content to hit 
apps. These strategies clearly conflict with professional logic, which stresses personal 
needs as a source of ideation and therefore might not result in apps that appeal to the 
mass market. In addition, further conflict arises when professional logic emphasizes 
personal use and continuous improvement while market logic is characterized by 
ideation driven by customer and market trends, which may not necessarily lead to 
continuous quality improvement. Thus, these two contrasting logics in app ideation 
each offer some benefits to nascent app entrepreneurs but conflict by emphasizing 
vastly different elements.
App Execution: Pursuit of Quality vs. Pursuit of Efficiency
The second stage of activity, app execution, is concerned with development 
effort on app release, maintenance, updates and app portfolio strategy. Developers 
anchoring on professional logic set high engineering standards before shipping apps. 
Participant DC stated: 
“Our standards are pretty high. We believe in having well thought out, well 
tested apps with excellent ease of use and good documentation. An app is ready to 
ship when it is feature complete, well tested, and has no known serious bugs.”
While software training institutionalizes the engineering aspect of the software, 
Apple’s platform characteristics and culture concurrently influence developers’ 
decisions on software design. Apple provides design guidelines for 3rd-party app 
developers and recognizes well-designed software with their annual design awards. 
Developers also look up to Apple products for design inspiration. These principles 
also influence software decisions, as described by developer NS: 
“When we release an app, we say, it’s gotta have a beautiful user interface, it’s 
gotta be intuitive, and it’s gotta be crisp. When someone looks at it, they have to say 
“this looks nice”. You also have to look at what Apple produces, and just say is this 
something Apple would release, does this look good enough to be an Apple product.”
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Although quality is the focus of attention for developers influenced by 
professional logic, those identifying with market logic embrace the idea of efficiency 
and time to market. When fighting for visibility on the App Store is extremely 
challenging, many developers engage in quick development and try every means to 
claim a spot in a new platform or a less crowded app category. The rapid rate of 
change on the platform provides many opportunities for the agile developer to 
exercise a “rush” strategy. For instance, the introduction of the iPad allowed 
entrepreneurs the chance to quickly port existing apps to the new platform, even if the 
design of the app was better suited to the mobile phone and not the tablet. 
Furthermore, the unpredictability of app sales on the App Store nurtures the practice 
of excessive experimentation as a strategy; this involves frequent app launch and 
limiting the level of effort on each app launched. As a consequence, these apps could 
suffer from low reliability and usability. With regard to design, instead of creating 
graphics or user interface with attention to detail, which follows professional logic, 
market logic-influenced developers tend to purchase stock images for app icons and 
make do with crude aesthetics and UI design. 
These app execution level strategies again highlight the tension between 
practices aligned with the two logics. While professional logic suggests polished app 
design and development as well as continual quality improvement, the uncertainty of 
sales on the App Store could easily render this practice costly and unrewarding. On 
the other hand, market logic execution suggests many quick apps, jettisoning apps that 
get no traction in the marketplace and quick updates, each of which saves valuable 
developer time and effort. These strategies however tend to fall short on core software 
engineering standards as well as Apple’s design guidelines for third-party developers. 
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App Marketing: Organic Word of Mouth vs. Hit and Consumer-Oriented Marketing 
Within the third stage, app marketing, developers make strategic decisions that 
concern spreading awareness of developed apps as well as focusing effort on 
supporting and communicating with end-users. Developers influenced by professional 
logic value peer recognition, i.e., they endorse each other’s apps through social media 
channels such as blogs and Twitter, with a focus on word of mouth to enhance 
awareness. In the meet-up group where many of our observations were conducted, the 
organizer makes an effort to create a culture of supporting indie app developers. 
Developers demo new apps in face to face meetings and make announcements on 
mailing lists about new releases. Developers enacting professional logic also tend to 
extend such peer-acceptance marketing strategy to the seller-consumer relationship. 
Assuming that end users have the ability to discover a good product on their own, 
developers believe that customer acquisition will automatically follow. This leads to a 
relatively passive marketing approach. Developers thus rely on organic product 
discovery, and refrain from initiating communication with end users unless specific 
support needs arise. They also resist the idea of consumer marketing ideologically, 
interpreting it as superficial compared to more tangible work like programming and 
coding. Participant NS provided this viewpoint: 
“My experiences have led me to believe that most of the time marketing is not 
helpful to a company. It feels all gimmicky to me, and maybe it’s just as a developer, 
I’m susceptible to those things more than other people, but I notice gimmicks, like I 
can see all this person did is tweet this contest again where they were giving out a 
Macbook Air, great. Another person flooding my stream on Twitter of content I don’t 
care about. We’re trying not to be gimmicky, and we try to just produce an awesome 
product that hopefully people will love, and that’s like our philosophy.”
Contrary to organic word of mouth and passive user communication, developers 
influenced by market logic value market recognition, i.e., they make full use of 
platform policies in ensuring app visibility. Essentially, the objective here is to 
21
introduce an app and achieve a “hit”, i.e., obtaining visibility through the top charts 
within the first few days, and extending the app’s top chart lifetime. In order to 
achieve this, developers aggressively use competitive pricing, versioning and 
advertising to start with. Subsequently, they release a stream of constant updates to 
the apps to encourage positive customer reviews. Finally, they try to increase the 
discoverability of the app through techniques such as in-app advertising, App Store 
Search Engine Optimization and cross-app promotions. 
Another significant component of the approach used by market logic-based 
developers here is to actively communicate and establish rapport with users, 
overcoming challenges posed by design of the platform. Our interviewees stated that 
Apple’s governance mechanisms tend to limit direct access to consumers who 
download the apps, i.e., developers are not provided with user information such as 
email addresses. In addition, end-users in general lack knowledge about the 
relationships between third-party developers, the platform and additional service 
providers. Thus, it is not uncommon for app developers to receive negative reviews of 
their apps that are, in fact, due to issues with the operating system or other service 
providers. Recognizing this and realizing that direct communication with end-users 
may remedy user confusion and enhance trust, entrepreneurs have creatively found 
ways to circumvent the platform’s governance. These include directing consumers 
from the app description to their websites, social networking sites and influential 
blogs. Developers are also active participants in user forums, responding to and 
providing support to consumers directly. A positive outcome of such open
communication is that relationships between developers and consumers reach a value 
co-creation stage (Nambisan and Baron 2007, Di Gangi and Wasko 2009) wherein 
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consumers suggest feature updates, evaluate such updates and even issue clarificatory 
information on behalf of the developer to other consumers. 
For these marketing level strategies, the tension between the two logics is clear 
in terms of the ideology espoused by developers who subscribe to differing logics as 
well as the effects of these activities on eventual app downloads. The “organic word 
of mouth” approach observed within professional logic might not be sufficient in 
pushing apps to App Store top charts, which is critical for app sales. On the other hand, 
the “hit” marketing approach does not provide the developers with adequate 
legitimacy in the developer community. Consumer-oriented marketing is not popular 
among developers who value peer opinions, thereby leading to further conflict for 
developers who may try to balance the two approaches. 
4.3. Logic Synthesis –Practices and Strategies
In this section, we move from describing logic practices to the process by which 
synthesis occurs. Recall that we proposed a broad definition of synthesis in the theory 
section. Here, we refine that definition. We propose that for logic synthesis to occur in 
the App Store context, either or both of the following conditions are met: first, app 
entrepreneurs are willing to engage in tasks they did not think were necessary or did 
not identify strongly to start with; second, entrepreneurs give up partly on activities 
that they identified strongly with. Synthesis, as per our arguments, occurs from both 
focal logics. For developers focused on professional logic, synthesis occurs in two 
ways. First, when concessions are made on practices consistent with the professional 
logic. Second, when elements of market logic are grafted onto existing practices. In 
both these cases, the developer is viewed to move to a more hybrid position with 
respect to the focal logics. A similar set of moves characterize synthesis for 
developers enacting market logic. We will discuss how developers synthesize 
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conflicting logics in the three entrepreneurial areas using this working definition. 
However, not all developers perceive the need to manage logic conflict in equal 
measure, so before delving into synthesis practices, we first delineate factors that 
drive or inhibit app developers’ synthesis practices. 
4.3.1. Antecedents of indie app developers’ logic synthesis 
Factors Inhibiting Logic Synthesis
We first discuss factors that inhibit logic synthesis, since these prevent eventual 
balance across logics, which is arguably important for success on the App Store. The 
literature indicates that strong identification with professional beliefs and norms
inhibit reconciliation (Glynn 2000, Nag et al. 2007). In addition, our analysis 
uncovers that relational capital from the Mac developer community and developers’ 
labor market status also tend to curb synthesis. 
The first factor that inhibits synthesis is the extent to which the developer is 
invested in his or her focal logic, leading to disagreement or disapproval for the 
opposing logic. Developers thus become less likely to compromise on the focal logic 
and/or integrate components from the opposite logic. This effect is particularly strong 
in app execution. For instance, developers with strong logics in product substance and 
quality see no value in compromise. “Releasing an app with just a couple of 
wallpapers?” - developer TM was dismissive of a wallpaper app, which cost 99 cents 
without much substantive content or originality. In contrast, market-logic focused 
developers in app execution do not understand why some developers invest effort in 
one single app. Developer DS responded: 
“I think there are a lot of people are more design purist, or engineering purist. 
Their goal is to make something beautiful, or make something cool, like technically, 
the code is really cool inside the way they do it. My goal in this is not like aesthetic, 
my goal is to make a living and support my family and support my employees’ family 
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on the apps we make, so that changes our priorities, that’s why we release things so 
quickly, we write simpler apps. It’s not just developing for developing’s sake” (DS).
Beliefs in focal logic also prevent developers from synthesis in app marketing. 
Developers who strongly believe in product quality and peer-marketing dislike the 
quick development cycle and the hit marketing strategy on the App Store. As 
developer JV stated: 
“I don’t want to have anything to do with it. I don’t think it’s common, not even 
possible to make 3 or 4 apps a year. I don’t want to be dependent on the hits; you have 
to have shorter cycle. Hopefully you will make a good hit out of every cycle. If I take a 
year to develop an app, if it’s not a hit, then I’m screwed.”
Developer NS similarly opposed the idea of frequent feature update, a part of the 
hit marketing strategy, in favor of organic word of mouth based on substantial feature 
changes: 
“I wanna be able to provide the features that people talk about. So on QB, a new 
version is coming up, ‘oh did you see QB added Skype’, ‘no I didn’t see that, it’s great, 
I use Skype all the time’, so that’s part of the philosophy. And the other part of the 
philosophy is the burden of updating is on the user really. And if they see your app 
coming up every week, they’ll be like, ‘what’s the point, why is it coming up every 
week or two?’ like nothing is changing.” 
On the other hand, developers believing in market recognition and in-App Store 
marketing do not understand why some developers would market apps among other 
app developers. Participant JS shared his opinion: 
“I’ve noticed people buy advertising on sites like iPhoneDevSDK. I never 
understood that, unless you’re making a product that’s oriented towards developers. I 
don’t see a lot of value in doing promotion of the applications to the developer 
community itself. Developers more than anybody are keenly aware of what’s out there 
on the App Store, what’s doing well and what’s not. So I think it’s way more important 
to be promoting a product to consumers than to developers.” 
The second factor that inhibits logic synthesis is iOS developers’ relational 
capital in the Mac developer community; the effect of this factor is most salient in app 
execution and app marketing. The Mac and iOS shares the foundation of the operating 
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system, so many Mac developers write iOS apps, too. The Mac indie software market 
is still largely dominated by personal capitalism, an instantiation of professional logic 
(Thornton 2001), where personal networks and personal relationship are valued in the 
business process (Meeteren 2008). Therefore, although it is advisable for Mac 
developers to compromise a little on product quality and adopt App Store-specific 
marketing techniques, they can afford not to. This is because the effort in pursing 
superior product design and quality is paid back with status in the Mac indie 
community rather than on the App Store. Tapping the mature network of this 
community is potentially rewarded with financial returns on iOS apps, as Developer 
RR indicated: 
“The first thing I did is that I announced it in the Chicago C4 Conference in 
front of about 200 people. One of the tech bloggers for the Mac Space John Gruber 
was at this conference, he saw it, he linked it to his site, just from this guy, and at this 
weekend, I got 2000 hits for my site. So I think there are two different ways, there’s I 
want to build a bunch of buzz about my app, trying to get in the top 10 of the App 
Store, and ride that wave out. And there’s another that no, I'm going to focus my 
attention in building a good quality product. The idea is that if you focus on building 
something that’s tight, that’s quality, that has a good crafted experience, all you need 
to do is get one of these people in these big sites to use it, love it, and then write about 
it. And in that sense you’re not propositioning people, and they are doing it for you.”  
The final factor that inhibits synthesis reflects the growing opportunities in the 
labor market for app developers. The App Store environment allows many software 
developers to create apps on a part-time basis, while still maintaining full-time 
positions in software development, similar to the open source model (Roberts et al. 
2006). The rapid growth of the app economy, combined with the relatively high levels 
of glamour attached to the mobile platforms, has enhanced the status of visible and 
successful app developers significantly. These factors have created significant app 
consulting opportunities for app developers, especially nascent entrepreneurs who 
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have boot-strapped their own firms. These potential opportunities for consulting tend 
to dampen the need to synthesize conflicting logics, especially for developers enacting 
professional logic in app marketing. Developer JR, who was occupied with consulting 
work, lacked the time in improving communication with end users about his popular 
app WZ and stated:
“Now on the App Store it only shows the reviews for the current version. So for
developers you really have to stay on top of that. WZ, last time I checked, there are 2 
reviews for the current version. People are disgruntled because it lacks something 
that it doesn’t claim to have. So people see those 2 reviews and it really impacts the 
downloads. If I were a better businessman, I would be pushing out a new update as 
soon as possible to get those bad reviews off, I would be doing everything in my 
power to get some reviews. I need to get those two off that page, I need to manage 
that. I’m not, and it’s a problem”. 
Factors Facilitating Logic Synthesis
With regard to factors facilitating logic reconciliation, the literature identifies the 
effect of entrepreneurial pressures and the desire to achieve economic success (Jain et 
al. 2009, Eikhof et al. 2007, Tschang 2007). In addition, our analysis reveals that 
entrepreneurial learning and knowledge acquisition need from community also 
enhance synthesis. Entrepreneurial learning addresses entrepreneurs’ adaptations in 
beliefs, practices and routines incrementally in response to feedback about outcomes 
over time (Levitt and March 1988, Huber 1991). Entrepreneurs acquire knowledge 
through direct experience –trial-and-error experimentation, or learning by doing 
process. Our fieldwork suggests that app entrepreneurs develop learning through 
interactions with the market, the platform and end-users, which induces synthesis. 
Community knowledge acquisition need denotes the communal knowledge-sharing 
characteristics of app entrepreneurs, viewing software developers as a community of 
practice (Brown and Duguid 1991), which again induces synthesis. In the next section, 
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we embed these factors in the discussion of logic synthesis across the three 
entrepreneurial areas. Our discussion follows the relationships shown in Figure 1. 
4.3.2. The Effective Mechanisms of Synthesis
Synthesis in App Ideation: Inner / Outer Evaluations & “Eating Your Own Dog 
Food”
In the app ideation phase, logic tension manifests around whether developers 
release apps fulfilling personal needs or addressing market needs. Logic synthesis, by 
our definition occurs from both focal logics. For professional-logic driven developers, 
entrepreneurial pressure and entrepreneurial learning push them towards logic 
synthesis in app ideation, through the form of “inner” and “outer” evaluations. 
Market-logic driven developers synthesize, alternatively, through “eating your own 
dog food”. 
Inner evaluation is for idea selection, either by being self-analytical or through 
peer critiquing. In doing so, synthesizing developers give up their preferred views on 
design and engineering quality while reducing the potential risk of developing apps 
with no market appeal. Entrepreneurial pressures forced developer TM to think twice 
what to develop before starting the project:  
“I think everyone has ideas. You need to be able to filter out your own ideas. I 
had A LOT OF ideas. And I look at them and I go, wait a minute, that one wouldn’t 
have mass appeal, why would I do that. I mean I’ve definitely thought and definitely 
heard of ideas that I thought were good ideas, but you know, would a lot of people buy 
it, if I say no, then I just don’t think it’s really worth the effort.”(TM) 
Developer JN’s first two apps did not gain as much traction as he had expected. 
He recognized that this may be due to his lone-ideation approach. This learning 
experience made him change his strategy to incorporate collective wisdom for future 
apps: 
“For my next app, I’m going to get a couple of people, I think you can fool 
yourself about what’s the best way to do things if you’re the only one deciding that. 
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And if other people think your ideas aren’t great enough to wanna work on them, they 
probably aren’t that great. In any case, they’re not gonna put in the extra hour. 
Examined by more than one peer advice will be really helpful.” 
Outer evaluation synthesis consists of leveraging users’ input through testing 
before releasing the app to the general public. Engaging users early on also requires 
developers to modify the software if needed, leading to changes in the execution plans. 
However, user feedback at this stage can improve software usability and gain 
customer loyalty from early adopters. Developer RR shared this viewpoint:
“Testing is really the counterbalance between developer’s needs and consumers’. 
Think about who you wanna sell it to, and get it in front of those people as soon as 
possible, because you won’t be able to guess what they want, they will always surprise 
you. You want this, gotta be this way. They will tell you the other way....feedback is the 
key.”
For developers enacting market logic on the other hand, entrepreneurial pressure 
drives synthesis. Several participants emphasized that while it is critical for an app to 
address a market need, it is also important to build something that they like or find 
useful. This synthesis is an instance of grafting elements from professional logic. 
Doing so leads to systematic use of the app by the developer himself (similar to a 
user), which allows bug and usability fixes early to improve quality. Developers refer 
to this as “eating your own dog food”, as stated below: 
“We’re doing a Calendar replacement. I’m using this as my main app for 
calendar, obviously looking for bugs and stuff, but I’m kind of living out the bugs so 
that my customers eventually don’t have to.” (KY)
Synthesis in App Execution: Emotional Detachment with Own Technology & 
Increased Emphasis on Design
In the app execution phase, developers face the conflict of emphasizing their 
business based on efficiency or quality. Following our two-way synthesis definition, 
we found that developers anchoring on professional logic synthesize through 
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detaching emotions with their own technology, and those anchoring on market logic 
achieve synthesis through increasing attention on app design. 
Entrepreneurial pressure and entrepreneurial learning motivate developers 
identifying with professional logic to synthesize, and this synthesis is manifested in 
app development, app release and app update decisions. During app development, 
synthesis occurs around developers’ decisions to build apps from ground up versus 
leveraging existing technologies. The latter option helps increase development 
efficiency, allowing developers to achieve synthesis through grafting elements from 
market logic. Developer TM learned the lesson on his very first app. He wrote the 
building blocks of the app all by himself when he could have saved effort and time 
using frameworks provided by Apple. In some cases, writing every aspect of an app 
from scratch is short-term efficient since adopting new APIs or functionality requires 
mastering new material. However, not leveraging well-maintained and widely adopted 
technologies can incur high in-house maintenance costs later on. Logic synthesis here 
indicates that the entrepreneur relinquish the “not-invented-here” mentality and 
leverage technologies from the larger developer community to achieve business 
efficiency. 
During the software release stage, developers face the question of when to stop 
development and publish the app on the market. Professional logic would suggest that 
the app be published when it is polished and of high quality. However, this logic 
ignores the financial cost of working on the software beyond the optimal point of 
release. This question is common in product development contexts, where there may 
be differences between manufacturing and marketing on product release dates 
(Tatikonda and Montoya-Weiss 2001). In the App Store context, synthesis occurs 
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when developers opt to forego new features in order to ship the app sooner, as stated 
by developer NL below:
“Like the WM application, it was pretty much done, and I was just working on 
supporting rotations, trying this way, this way, it doesn’t rotate correctly. I spent like 2 
weeks working on it. At the end, I'm like, you know we had to cut out rotation …I 
wanna ship things that are good, but sometimes you have to see the forest through the 
tree. Sometimes you focus so much on this one little thing, and then you look back and 
you just spent thousands of dollars trying to get this little one thing right. So maybe 
think bigger, more strategically.”
While NL’s synthesis in cutting features was driven by entrepreneurial pressure, 
developer SJ was driven by learning from a trademark dispute he had on an earlier 
app. The dispute was finally settled with SJ selling his app name, but the incident took 
6 months to resolve. Recognizing the potential risks of losing the app name and being 
dragged into a trademark dispute again, for the next app, SJ decided to leave behind 
features that were not as important and get the app on the market fast: 
“Basically the first person who has it in commerce, they are the first person who 
gets the name. And if somebody names their app PP tomorrow and I hadn’t put it out, 
and also I gotta change my name and everything. So, and again it’s all because of the 
trademark experience I had with MQ, and so I was like, you know what, I gotta put it 
out. It doesn’t matter what it looks like. I just gotta get the name. So what I did, I 
ripped off all the voice-over stuff, and there are some screens, they didn’t look so good 
going out, but they didn’t need to be there, so I ripped out whatever didn’t look good, 
just to kind of put it out, and people loved it.”
In addition to software development and release, synthesis also takes place 
during software update decisions. Here, synthesis generally indicates a “move-on” 
attitude, wherein developers opt to stop enhancing an existing app with limited market 
demand, even though professional logic would suggest these improvements. 
Developer JN shared his experience: 
“I spent a lot of time to get network work properly after the initial release, 
because now people can compete head to head, and it’s something people will like. 
And it was really difficult... so I spent A LOT of time getting it to work right, and it 
works really well, but almost no pump in sales, something I thought people are going 
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to appreciate, they don’t really appreciate that much...was very large time investment 
for very little return.”
Developers identifying with market logic also engage in synthesis practices in 
app execution, although for different reasons: their experience with platform policy 
changes and user interactions. Specifically, they move away from the “rush” strategy 
and invest resources in product design, detailed UI and the aesthetics of the app, most 
of which would not be necessary under pure market logic. Developer TM’s original 
strategy “was to release as fast as you can, and update as fast as you can.” He stated 
that “If I had a few bugs, I’d just send it up there; I would cut corners and constantly 
add features.” However, in November 2009, Apple changed a key policy on the App 
Store: it began to only allow the first version of the app to appear on the release chart3
instead of every new version. This change put crudely engineered apps at risk since 
user response to the first version became more critical than ever for apps’ subsequent 
performance. Interviewees in this study could not emphasize enough that post-policy 
change, their apps only got one shot at being viewed on the new-release chart. For 
market-logic driven developers, the new policy necessitated a process of synthesis, as 
indicated by developer TM: “I do more initial develop; you need to spend more time, 
polish it up, test it, market it, appropriately.” Whereas previously the goal was 
constant appearance among consumers, now TM aims at making a splash on the 
initial launch. Placing emphasis on design has its own positive impact on app 
download, achieved through platform featuring: 
“I mean everything Apple features is something that has a lot of polish on it. 
They go above and beyond the bare minimum. And I’ve produced apps at bare 
minimum, and they never get featured. And then this GB was the first game ever 
featured of mine. I had a lot of games, but this is the first time I actually spent all my 
time on polish, making it pretty, adding in dancing, the glowing balls are dancing to 




music; that’s not necessary, that’s just the polish that people like. And I think that’s 
what Apple looks for.” (TM)
Besides platform influence, end-user interactions are another source of learning 
that motivates developers solely focused on business outcomes to consider software 
quality, design and aesthetics, thereby enabling synthesis. Developer KR’s recording 
app is popular thanks to its mass market appeal and powerful features. However, the 
design of the icon and user interface attracted a number of user complaints. As a result, 
KR decided to give the app a new look: 
“I did everything one my own. Now that I’m making more money, I think I’m 
gonna hire a graphic artist to clean up the user interface, change all the graphics and 
design better icons. I’ve got several reviews saying that the user interface is kind of 
clunky.” 
To some extent, the App Store environment itself is dialectic. On one hand, 
competition and sales unpredictability prevent app developers from investing in too 
much polish. On the other hand, the platform and its users reward effort on apps’ 
aesthetics and design. Therefore, a broad synthesis strategy at least for app 
development and app release, is to make “simple yet polished apps”(developer TM),
or “a fully-polished product that doesn’t include all of the features you expect to 
include in the product eventually”(developer JS). 
Synthesis in App Marketing: Peer Partnership, Niche Marketing & Peer 
Community Contribution
In the app marketing stage, developers face the tension of whether to count on 
organic word of mouth for marketing or adopt the “hit” and consumer-oriented 
marketing strategy. Again, as synthesis occurs from two directions, our fieldwork and 
interviews uncovered that professional logic-driven developers synthesize through 
engaging peer partnership and niche marketing, and market logic-driven developers 
synthesize through peer community contribution. 
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For professional-logic oriented developers, entrepreneurial pressure highlights 
the importance of within-App Store marketing to achieve visibility and sales. One 
synthesis strategy employed is partnership with peers who have popular apps on the 
App Store. In doing so, developers still rely on support from the developer 
community –an instantiation of logic of the profession, however, the partnership 
allows their product to reach the mass market on the App Store, which is in accord 
with logic of the market:
“One of the things we partner with FS company who has a significant presence 
in the market place is they have a network of head-to-head play games, so by 
partnering with them, we can sort of use their existing distribution network, and their 
network of players, as long as the game is of similar quality, and meets the interests of 
their customer base, we should be able to be successful, should be able to step on 
their foundation.” (DC)
Synthesis in app marketing is influenced by entrepreneurial learning as well. 
Developers whose apps compete in content with Apple’s native apps face legitimacy 
issues among both the developer community and the general consumer base. App 
Store legitimacy becomes particularly problematic among peers who identify strongly 
with Apple’s culture, or those who view stepping on the platform’s turf as risky 
behavior. Developer RH wrote a music play-list app intended to replace native 
functionality of Apple’s iPod. This move led to dissenting voices in the developer 
community, suggesting that the developer “doesn’t get the platform”and that “You 
don’t redesign Apple’s stuff.”When sharing the app with his developer peers, RH did 
not receive the support he expected. Peer recommendation turned out not to be a 
viable marketing tool in this case. Based on this experience, RH decided to target his 
app to hardcore music fans only. Even though the niche marketing reduced the sales 
potential, the app received very positive reviews on the App Store. In general, while 
the platform encourages open innovation, the professional logic-driven developer is 
reminded that there are limits to openness, especially in garnering support from peers 
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who identify strongly with the platform. An alternative consumer-oriented niche 
marketing strategy is preferred here. 
Market-logic driven developers engage in synthesis during app marketing 
through peer community contribution. This allows developers to integrate peer 
recognition and feedback with their logic’s emphasis on market recognition. Software 
development as a profession relies on teams and communities of practice (Faraj and 
Sproull 2000, Von Krogh et al. 2003, Crowston et al. 2006) for knowledge sharing 
due to the range of technologies involved and the pace of technological advancement. 
Several participants in our study mentioned that the indie work style does not allow 
colleagues to exchange knowledge on a regular basis, therefore joining a peer 
community and accessing peer knowledge becomes particularly critical for business 
success. A good example of this type of synthesis is Developer DS, who pursues a hit-
oriented marketing strategy by focusing on App Store rankings and in-store visibility. 
In the meantime, he contributes extensively to the iOS community locally and 
virtually. He holds “Office Hours” to invite local developers to join his office space to 
chat about work and documents his iOS development and business experience on his 
blog. Thus, DS does not compromise on market logic in marketing but extends his 
practices in accord with professional logic. Although DS’s philosophy on app 
marketing differs considerably from his peers, he earns positive word of mouth for his 
contribution to the community, thereby increasing his marketing effectiveness. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion
How do nascent app entrepreneurs address the conflicts they experience from 
trying to balance their professional practices as software developers, on one hand, and 
the need to effectively manage a competitive marketplace, on the other? How are 
these conflicts dealt with in different entrepreneurial areas? These questions formed 
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the basis for the analysis we present in this paper. The conflict between professional 
and market logics has been studied in the literature over time, as the institutional 
discourse shifts (Thornton 2002, 2004), or between social actors with different group 
and organizational identities (Glynn 2000, Nag et al. 2007). In our context, we study 
how these conflicts are contemporaneously managed within the same app 
entrepreneur via the concept and process of logic synthesis. Through a qualitative 
study, we develop a deeper understanding of how both logics can occupy an app 
entrepreneur’s decision portfolio and compete for the entrepreneur’s attention. We 
show the different mechanisms of and conditions for the two-way logic synthesis. Our 
work thus contributes to the literature on the relationship between individuals and 
institutional logic, as well as nascent entrepreneurship.
Two broad sets of factors shape the professional and market logic guiding 
decisions and strategies for indie app entrepreneurs. They are 1) software developers’ 
professional training, their interest in tinkering and the nature of community of 
practice, as well as 2) Apple’s new organizing form as both a technological platform 
and an exclusive distribution channel. Since both of these logics act on the same indie 
app developers, the setting allows us to investigate these unfolding dynamics of logic 
synthesis at a level of granularity that is rare in the institutional logics literature. 
Our study identified three entrepreneurial areas in which logics get expressed: 
app ideation, execution and marketing. We find that practices in accord with 
professional logic include “ideating” new apps through personal needs and passions, 
pursuing high engineering standards and employing peer recommendation to market 
their apps. Practices in accord with market logic, on the other hand, entail reacting to 
mass-market needs and trends, following an efficiency-oriented strategy as well as a 
hit and consumer-oriented marketing strategy. Our findings suggest that the tension is 
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stronger in app execution and app marketing than in app ideation for app developers 
because of the markedly different meanings attached to app quality and variety of 
ways in which an app may be discovered, sought or marketed on the App Store. While 
app ideation is important, the market-oriented activities such as marketing and 
development provide more observable instances of logic conflict that need synthesis. 
We observe that most developers have a starting logic: that of professional or 
market, in all three entrepreneurial areas at the inception of writing apps for the App 
Store. Then depending on specific circumstances the entrepreneur experiences, some 
aspects of the logic portfolio become more salient than others, and thus s/he can 
synthesize in one area but not others or in none at all. Although engaging in logic 
synthesis would be ideal for all entrepreneurs, we do not claim it happens in all 
circumstances, nor do we observe this in our fieldwork. We found that three hurdles 
are present for logic synthesis: beliefs in focal logic, relational capital from Mac 
developer community and indie developers’ labor market status. In contrast, three 
other factors: entrepreneurial pressure, entrepreneurial learning, and knowledge 
acquisition need in community of practice facilitate logic synthesis. These synthesis 
drivers, to some extent, echo the socialization mechanism necessary for individuals to 
learn multiple contrasting and often contradictory institutional logics (Thornton et al. 
2012). Entrepreneurial pressure and entrepreneurial learning are especially relevant to 
socialization, because they serve as two conduits that help developers understand and 
familiarize the different requirement and characteristics of the App Store market place, 
the platform culture and software engineering principles. Without this constant 
pressure to achieve success or to learn from the marketplace, most entrepreneurs 
would find it very hard to operate in the fast-moving App Store environment. Thus, 
these two factors are of particular importance to app developers.
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The concept of logic synthesis proposed in our study entails either or both of 
focal logic compromise and opposite logic grafting. We extend the literature by 
identifying practices of two-way logic anchoring and synthesis, whereas extant 
literature tends to mostly recognize reconciliation only from professional to market 
logic. Our findings suggest that for indie app developers, the key to success on the 
App Store is to constantly consider strategies congruent with both the professional 
and market logic and synthesize from both directions. Besides, since conditions on the 
App Store constantly change either due to changing competition or platform policy 
changes, different entrepreneurial activities can become salient at different times, 
which shape developers’ goals and actions. This suggests that indie app developers 
need to engage in logic synthesis in a dynamic, rather than static fashion, in order to 
remain relevant and stay competitive.
Synthesis practices carried out by developers in our study are informative to other 
entrepreneurs who are considering entry into the competitive app economy. While low 
entry barriers and the lure of “hits” increases competition, our results suggest that a 
balanced and dynamic approach to both institutional logics on the App Store is a 
better position for success. Findings from our research also have implications for 
nascent entrepreneurs in other professional arenas building businesses around a 
central platform. Examples include photographers selling photos through 
istockphoto.com and artists selling craftwork on etsy.com. While the professional 
logic and market logic vary for each of these markets, the underlying relationship 
between the two logics and logic synthesis strategies identified in this research can 
provide a framework for studying professions beyond software development.
Our work also points to several directions for future work in this context. When 
we delineated entrepreneurial learning as a driving force for developers’ synthesis 
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practices, we did not include learning from peers as one aspect. Social interactions 
with other developers could be an important influence on developers’ decisions and 
formation of synthesis practices, which we aim to incorporate in future research. We 
have argued for the value of logic synthesis but whether this is true across Apple’s 
App Store, or indeed on any mobile platform, i.e., the Android, is an empirical 
question. It is also possible that one of the antecedents to synthesis is competition –
competitive categories on the platform likely will incentivize synthesis compared to 
categories with lesser competition. While our codes did not address this directly in our 
study, competition remains a potent driver of entrepreneurial behavior. It is often 
assumed that larger firms active in the marketplace have resolved logic conflict by 
empowering market logic (Thornton 2002); however, is this necessarily true in 
environments where there is a powerful gate-keeper such as Apple? Our focus here is 
on nascent entrepreneurs but there are several large corporations also competing on 
the App Store. How does existing research on logic conflict translate to these firms on 
platforms? There are many such questions that can be addressed on mobile 
technology platforms and it is our hope that our work will contribute to and spark off 
more interest in the topic of institutional logics in the technology platforms context.
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Table 1   Data Sources
Data source Description
Field observations 29 visits to multiple meet-ups of Mac and iOS 
developers and events for mobile entrepreneurs in the 
Middle Atlantic Region, totaling over 90 hours 
Interviews 26 semi-structured face to face interviews and 
multiple informal chats with 19 iOS indie app 
entrepreneurs who have released at least 1 app on the 
App Store
Online resources Company websites, blogs, user forum, Facebook fan 
pages of the 19 entrepreneurs
Participant observation 10-month internship at a small mobile app company; 
working on tasks related to market research, 
marketing and technology support
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Examples Practices of market 
logic 
Examples
App ideation  Building 
apps reflecting 
personal needs and 
passion
“There is this one person says that not 
everybody is gonna design your way, 
maybe you should survey how different 
designers do work, you should come up 
with some mixture of process. I say no. I 
feel that to build a quality product, I have 
to build something that I wanna use, and I 
love using it…”(RR)
“That application was developed by me 
and for me, and that has been 
tremendously successful. Caz that’s my 
way I bicycle, I use it all the time, 
interval, music, for the intensity I want, so 
it’s fulfilling a need.” (JB)
 Addressing 
mass market needs 
 Following 
market trend
“We had a good number of downloads from 
our alarm clock app, because people want 
that vs. some niche little app, that maybe can 
get big traction, but it’s harder to determine if 
that’s the case” (KY). 
“For NT, it came from the fact that I saw the 
MT being number 1 for quite a while, so I 
wanted to create a knockoff. The idea was I 
wanted to look for something that’s really 
high in the charts and really easy to 
implement (KR).
App execution  Pursuing 
engineering and 
design quality
“I consider myself as an engineer. 
Engineers are trained in a much more 
systematic way to produce code and solve 
problems. I’ve had a couple of encounters 
with people that I consider to be coders 
and not engineers. It sounds a little bit 
elitist, but it’s just a matter of training.” 
(JN) 




“There’s not that many iPad apps now, there’s 
still a rush to get what’s called universal apps 
or ipad apps, so you can get visibility again” 
(TM)
“So if we launch something and it doesn’t do 
great, I will just move on. These are just like 
we spend a week or we spend 4 days on 
something. If it doesn’t take off, it’s fine, I 
learned to build something new that I didn’t 
know how to build before, I’ll try the next 
thing” (DS).
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“The biggest thing that I do is I write 
official blog entries to make it convey that 
there are serious developers behind this, 
so anybody that does come to the website, 





over users from 
the platform
“We found the most effective approaches are 
the approaches that are directly actionable by 
users, where they could click and download 
the app” (JS).
“Once you build an app, it kind of turns into 
a monster. It’s popular. It’s your baby until 
you release it. And it’s the world that decides 
what you should do with it. And if they want 
something, you gotta put it in there” (TM).
Synthesis from 







Figure 1  Independent iOS App Entrepreneurs’ Two
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and end-users
Knowledge acquisition 





Essay 2: From invisible hand to visible hand: platform governance and institutional 
logic of independent Mac developers, 2001-2012
Abstract
In the research of institutional logics, field-level logics have continuously gained interests 
among institutional scholars. A cultural emergence model of field-level logics was 
proposed in the latest development of the institutional logics perspective (Thornton, 
Ocasio and Lounsbury 2012). This study aims to validate a section of the model: the 
relationship between resource environment and emergence and evolution of field-level 
logics, and do so in the context of Apple’s desktop developers –Mac indies. I examine a 
critical platform governance change from Apple –its opening of the iOS App Store and 
subsequently the Mac App Store, and hence its role shifting from mainly a technological 
platform to a platform that includes a market exchange place, and dissect the content of 
Mac developers’ institutional logic before and after the change in resource environments. 
Through a qualitative interpretive study, and a combination of narrative and content 
analysis, I show that a software ecosystem logic prevailed for Mac developers prior to the 
opening of the App Store, and a platform ecosystem logic emerged after that.  For 
software developers, two layers of resource environments are present –platform 
governance and developers’own economy. Together, they influence software developers’
institutional logic through both material practices and symbolic meanings. Two ideal 
types are constructed for the logics along elemental categories, and a content analysis 
demonstrates the logic shift pattern as resource environments change. A further analysis 
of the two logics suggests that the software ecosystem logic and platform ecosystem logic 
are in contestation at this early stage of institutional change. This study has implications 
for research in institutional logics and platform governance. 
Keywords: field-level institutional logics; resource environment; platform governance; 
independent software developers; qualitative research; ideal types
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Introduction
During the past two decades, the institutional logic theory has undergone substantial 
theoretical and empirical development. Originally established in the seminal work by 
Friedland and Alford (1991), it has been a great tool in responding to the critique on the 
neo-institutional theory by DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 1991). The criticism on the latter 
is that the main concept of the theory: institutional isomorphism and organizational 
homogeneity “proffers a rather monolithic or unitary concept of the environment and the 
legitimacy of institutional myths, and with this an implicit overtone of the legitimacy of 
conformity to change”(Townley 1997: 262). Institutional logic perspective in contrast,
argues that institutional environments are pluralistic, and the society is composed of a set 
of interdependent and yet contradictory interinstitutional logics, each with differing belief 
systems and sources of rationality (Friedland and Alford 1991). Broadly conceptualized 
as the “socially constructed organizing principles that shape individual preferences and 
organizational interests as well as the repertoire of behaviors by which interests and 
preferences are attained”(Friedland and Alford 1991: 232), institutional logic has been 
instrumental in explaining the heterogeneity in organizational decisions and routines
(Thornton and Ocasio 1999, Thornton 2002, 2004, Lounsbury 2002, 2007), contestation 
and resistance behavior at organizational and individual levels (Townley 1997, 2002, 
Reay and Hinings 2005, Marquis and Lounsbury 2007, Qiu, Gopal and Hann 2012), and 
change and evolution of organizational fields (Nigam and Ocasio 2010, van Gestel and 
Hillebrand 2011). 
Following the characteristic of nested multi-levelness of the theory, Thornton and 
colleagues developed the concept of institutional logic at the level of the industry or field 
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(Thornton and Ocasio 1999, 2008, Thornton 2002, 2004). In the recent advancement, 
Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury (2012) articulate a cultural emergence model of 
formation of field-level institutional logics, and explicate the mechanisms through which 
cross-level effects operate. Taking a linguistic approach, the model illustrates how 
societal level and external logics as well as resource environment form field-level logics 
through shaping both the material practices and symbolic representations in the field. 
While the theoretical relationships and processes are documented in the model, more 
empirical studies are needed for model validation. In addition to logic emergence, the 
model also theorizes the change and evolution of the field-level institutional logic, and 
the authors urge that great care must be exercised in future research in expressing what 
aspects of the field-level practices are changing and how changing practices reflect 
changing symbolic meanings and institutional logic (Thornton et al. 2012: p169). 
The objective of this study is to particularly investigate the effect of resource 
environment on the emergence and change of field-level institutional logic in the field of 
consumer software industry, and particularly of Apple’s desktop platform and its 
independent third-party developers. Resource environment, according to Thornton et al. 
(2012) can include market and other forms of governance, such as governments, 
corporations, and information networks (p157). Scholars have identified that market 
conditions such as consumer demand and resource competition (Thornton 2002, Rao 
1998), and public regulatory practices such as state or provincial public policies (Reay
and Hinings 2005, 2009, Townley 1997, 2002), and professional associations 
(Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings 2002) are forms of resource environment, which 
provides opportunities for the emergence of new institutional logics. Although literature 
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has implied that resource environment can constitute multiple forms or events for an 
institutional field (e.g. Hoffman 1999); in the field of software industry there is a 
hierarchical relationship between different parts of the resource environments, and an 
understanding of that can provide us with better knowledge about formation and change 
of field-level institutional logics. 
Third-party developers are software platform’s external innovative assets, who build 
complementary applications based on platform’s core technologies (Tiwana, Konsynski 
and Bush 2010, Gawer 2010). Together the collection of the platform, third-party 
developers, their complementary creations for the platform, and the users formulate the 
ecosystem around a given platform (Tiwana et al. 2010, Gawer 2010, Cusumano 2010). 
Most software platforms exercise governance and control over developers (Linux being 
an exception) to various degrees through technological and non-technological means 
(Tiwana et al. 2010). Thus, the platform constitutes key resource environment for 
developers. At the same time, developers operate in a free market and create their own 
economy together with other market participants. This market is influenced by the 
platform, in terms of its installed base and customer characteristics; however it is still a 
self-contained economy with its own internal coherence. The market conditions therefore 
form the second part of the resource environment for developers. How then do resource 
environments lead to the emergence of field-level logic of independent Mac developers? 
This is the first research question I intend to answer in this study. In addition to 
formulation of institutional logics, literature has documented the effect of change in 
resource environments, such as environmental jolts, shocks, or critical events on 
institutional change (Nigam et al. 2010, Sine and David 2003, Hoffman 1999). For third-
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party developers, changes in their resource environment include direct ones from the 
platform, such as platform governance change, as well as indirect ones, which are 
affected by the platform governance change and occur in developers’ own economy. So 
the second research question I intend to explore is: how do changes in resource 
environments impact third-party developers’ institutional logic? For the study, I examine 
a critical platform governance change from Apple –its opening of the iOS App Store and 
subsequently the Mac App Store, and hence its role shifting from mainly a technological 
platform to a platform that includes a market exchange place, and dissect the content of 
Mac developers’ institutional logic before and after the change in resource environments. 
Regarding the outcome of field-level institutional logic change, literature has illustrated 
various forms of change based on their direction and extent (Thornton et al. 2012), such 
as settlement of a new dominant logic (Thornton 2002, Rao, Monin, and Durand 2003), 
stable co-existence of competing logics (Dunn and Jones 2010, Reay and Hinings 2009, 
Purdy and Grey 2009, Lounsbury 2007), or ongoing logic change (van Gestel et al. 2011). 
What is under-explored is the relationship between resource environment and logic 
change outcome. Therefore, the third research question this study intends to answer is 
what the dynamics are between the incumbent logic and the new logic of third-party Mac 
developers and how resource environments impact such dynamics.  
Leveraging online archival data sources and combining narrative and content 
analysis (Nigam and Ocasio 2010), I trace the logic formulation and evolution for 
independent Mac developers, or Mac indies as called by themselves. Usually composed 
of one or two people, these micro-sized software firms write apps for Apple’s desktop 
computer platform and sell them directly to customers mainly through the Internet. The 
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findings reveal that a software ecosystem logic prevailed for Mac developers prior to the 
opening of the App Store. During that time, Apple as resource environment provides the 
hardware and operating system technologies as well as development tools and design 
guidelines to developers. It also conveys a sense of coolness and the innovative spirit, and 
infuses an artistic pride in software and personal computers. Resource environment 
within developers’ own economy comprises the Internet as a distribution channel, 
proliferation of infrastructure service providers and software technologies, and a 
customer base mainly composed of power users and Mac enthusiasts. This resource 
environment not only facilitates Mac indies to run viable software business, it also helps 
developers to build a strong identity of independence. Together, these resource 
environments shape the software ecosystem logic of Mac indie developers. After Apple 
changed governance mechanism by entering the software distribution domain in addition 
to being a technology platform, a different logic: platform ecosystem logic emerged. New 
rules and regulations from Apple ensue, and these send a strong message of control and 
bureaucracy to Mac indie developers. The governance change has also brought about new 
market dynamics and different profiles of fellow developers and end users; hence it 
changes the economic conditions that developers previously have operated in. The 
change in the market conditions serves as a catalyst for developers to redefine their 
software valuation and relationship with the platform. All these changes in the resource
environments thus help create a new type of institutional logic for developers. A further 
analysis of the two logics suggests that the software ecosystem logic and platform 
ecosystem logic are in contestation at this early stage of institutional change, and the 
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organizational learning practices from one of the resource environments –the platform, 
reinforces this contestation for Mac developers. 
This research first of all deepens our understanding about the emergence and 
evolution of institutional logics in the field of consumer software industry through 
examining the cross-level processes. Secondly, I illustrate in detail the characteristics and 
effect of resource environments in a field with structure different than what has been 
traditionally studied as an institutional field –the resource environments in the software 
industry exhibit a hierarchical and two-layer characteristic. Thirdly, I identify the 
temporal logic shift pattern evidenced in the changing field-level practices and symbolic 
meanings through a content analysis. This research also contributes to the software 
platform governance and software ecosystem literature by emphasizing the role of third-
party developers in the software ecosystem. Through an institutional field 
conceptualization, I identify and explicate the material practices and symbolic 
representation of platform governance and third-party developers. I aim to construct 
software developers as institutional actors, who do not just write compatible software for
a platform, but in fact constantly interpret and make meanings of governance 
mechanisms from the platform, which explains their subsequent practices and strategies. 
This study hence adds a symbolic and cultural lens to the software platform governance 
literature, which currently is mainly composed of perspectives on architecture-modular
design (Baldwin and Clark 2000, Baldwin and Woodard 2009), economic explanations
(Katz and Shapiro, Rochet and Tirole 2003, 2006, Parker and Van Alstyne 2005, 2012, 
Eisenmann, Parker and Van Alstyne 2009), and organizational considerations (Gawer and 
Henderson 2007, Cusumano and Gawer 2002). Apple’s context is unique for the research 
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questions in the study. In recent years, the consumer IT industry witnesses a growing 
number of platforms adopting the “App Store” model, such as in software (mobile and 
desktop), social networking, web browsers and e-publishing. I aim to use Apple’s 
ecosystem as a starting point to study the impact of platform’s governance of technology 
and market distribution on third-party developers. 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, I review literature on field-level logic
emergence and evolution, followed by literature on software platform governance. Then I 
describe the methodology used for the study. In the findings section, I first present a 
narrative on developers’ institutional logics before and after the change in resource 
environment; then I show the changing pattern of the two logics from results of a content 
analysis; and lastly I illustrate the dynamics between the two logics. The study concludes 
with discussions and implications. 
Theoretical background
Emergence of field-level institutional logics
Building on the seminal work by Friedland and Alford (1991), Thornton and Ocasio 
(1999) define institutional logic as “the socially constructed, historical patterns of cultural 
symbols and material practices, including assumptions, values, and beliefs, by which 
individuals and organizations provide meaning to their daily activity, organize time and 
space, and reproduce their lives and experiences.” (P804). The meta-theory of
institutional logic is that “to understand individual and organizational behavior, it must be 
located in a social and institutional context, and this institutional context both regularizes 
behavior and provides opportunity for agency and change” (Thornton and Ocasio 2008: 
102). This meta-theory allows institutional logic to develop at multiple levels, just as 
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Friedland and Alford wrote in the original piece: “An adequate social theory must work at 
three levels of analysis –individuals competing and negotiating, organizations in conflict 
and coordination, and institutions in contradiction and interdependency (1991: 240). 
Over the years, Thornton and her colleagues have developed institutional logic at the 
level of industry or field (e.g. Thornton et al. 1999, Thornton 2002, 2004). They argue for 
the effect of societal-level logic on the formation of field logic by positing that “field-
level logics are both embedded in societal-level logics and subject to field-level processes 
that generate distinct forms of instantiation, variation, and combination of societal logics” 
(Thornton et al. 2012: p148). For instance, the fiduciary logic in public accounting is a 
hybridization of logic of the profession and religion; the aesthetic logic in architecture is 
a hybrid of professional and market logic, and the editorial logic in higher-education 
publishing is a variant of professional logic (Thornton, Jones and Kury 2005). These 
field-level logics are instantiations of societal-level logics, and the specific historical, 
cultural and material contingencies in the field lead to field-specific variations in 
practices (Thornton 2012: p149). 
In a recent development of cultural emergence model on field-level logics, Thornton 
et al. (2012) delineate the mechanisms through which cross-level effects operate. 
Building on the premise that institutional logics are both symbolic and material 
(Friedland and Alford 1991), they expand it by taking a linguistic turn to explain the 
construction of field-level logics. Because institutional logics reflect cognitive, normative 
and material forces (Thornton et al. 2012), they are embodied in the vocabularies and 
communication of members of social groups (Loewenstein and Ocasio 2009). As 
narratives create new systems of categories that link category labels to field-level 
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organizing practices (Thornton et al. 2012:159), or change meanings of existing 
categories (Ruef 1999), distinct institutional logics emerge. Their model is included in 
Figure 1a in the appendix, and a brief summary of the constructs and the processes in the 
model is as follows. The authors argue that societal logics, or external logics, defined as 
“the institutional logics developed in other institutional fields”, are building blocks for 
the formation of field-level institutional logics. Providing both opportunities and 
constraints for field-level practices, resource environment affects emergence of field-
level institutional logics through material forces, as well as cognitive, cultural and 
political factors. Vocabularies of practice, defined as “systems of labeled categories used 
by members of a social collective to make sense of and construct organizing practices”, 
provide a critical linchpin which brings together symbolic representations, in the form of 
theories, frames and narratives and practices in formulating field-level institutional logics
(Thornton et al. 2012: 150-161). Relationships particularly examined in the current study 
are presented in Figure 1b. 
Field level institutional logic change
In addition to logic emergence, institutional logic change at industry or field level has 
continued to be of interest to institutional logic scholars.  According to the cultural 
emergence model by Thornton et al. (2012), evolution and change in institutional logics 
can result from exogenous changes in societal and external logics, changes in the 
resource environment, and internal contradictions between symbolic representations and 
material practices in institutional fields (p161-162). In examining financial intermediaries 
in the U.S., Lounsbury (2002) documented that the stable regulatory logic established in 
the 1930s was replaced by the market logic due to a deregulation act in 1980. He argued 
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that this industry-level logic shift may be better viewed as an outcome of the general 
cultural shift from a regulatory to a market logic that unfolded gradually over the period 
since midcentury (p257). This example shows the effect of changes in both societal level 
logic and resource environments on the shift of field-level logics. New government 
policies are often theorized as a form of changing resource environment and they not only 
affect field level logics through material changes in regulatory act, but also symbolic 
representation reflected in their underlying logics. For instance, researchers document 
responses from universities and museums to a new government policy of business and 
performance measure (Townley 1997, 2002), and physicians’ responses to provincial 
government’s structural change to the healthcare system in Alberta (Reay and Hinings 
2005, 2009). These new policies challenge the incumbent logics with their distinct 
symbolic meanings and rationalities and bring forth new status in field-level logics. 
Changes in resource environments are also manifested in occurrence of critical events, 
which trigger field level logic change. Hoffman (1999) demonstrate that a series of 
disruptive events, such as the publication of Silent Spring of 1962, beginning of the Earth 
Day and formation of the EPA in 1970, and the discovery of Ozone hole in 1985, etc., led 
to the emergence of environmentalist logics in the U.S. chemical industry. Glynn and 
Lounsbury (2005) show that the 1996 Atlanta Symphony Orchestra musicians’strike 
resulted in an increased attention to the market logic, reflected in critics’reviews, in 
addition to the aesthetic logic, which previously had dominated the symphony practices.
As well, Nigam et al. (2010) illustrate how environmental sensemaking of the event of 
President Clinton’s healthcare reform initiative in 1993-1994 led to the emergence of a 
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new logic of managed care, which replaced previous logics of physician authority and 
managed competition model.
Besides exogenous shocks, internal contradiction is another source that catalysts 
field-level logic change. In a series of studies on the integration of a new organizational 
form in a mature institutional field –professional accounting, it was found that the big 
five accounting firms, which have privileged access to resources and practices, are able to 
initiate institutional logic change (a shift from a professional logic to a corporate logic) 
from the center of an institutional field, and the legitimacy was gained through contested 
arguments and languages, which expose the underlying contradictions inherent in 
professionalism (Suddaby and Greenwood 2005, Greenwood and Suddaby 2006).
Regarding the various forms of field-level institutional logic change, Thornton et al. 
(2012) categorize them into transformational change and developmental change based on 
the direction and extent of change. What is particularly relevant to the current study is 
logic contestation and co-existence of competing logics. Townley (1997, 2002) illustrate 
that universities and museums reject certain aspects of the business planning and 
performance measure because the rationalities and logics implied in the two sets of 
practices are in conflict. Marquis and Lounsbury (2007) document that the community 
banking and national banking logics were competing from the very beginning of the U.S. 
banking industry, and the community logic resisted to be engulfed by national banking 
logic when a regulatory policy allowed for national banks’acquisition of smaller, local 
banks. Besides contestation, competing logics can also peacefully co-exist. Purdy and 
Gray (2009) identify that diverse institutional practices co-exist as emerging field 
develops within a 22-year period through mechanisms such as transformation, grafting, 
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bridging and exit. Reay et al. (2009) demonstrate that physicians and government agency 
employees in the Alberta healthcare field are able to manage the conflict through the 
development of collaborative relationships. Dunn and Jones (2010) also suggest logic 
pluralism by revealing that in the field of medical education, logics of care and science 
are supported by distinct groups and interests and they co-exist and fluctuate over time.
Structure of software industry and third-party developers’ resource environment
Because the focus of this study is institutional logic in the field of consumer software 
industry, here I review literature related to developers’ resource environment. Third-party 
software developers’ resource environment is highly tied to the structure of the software 
industry. A typical two-sided market, software platform aims to bring both sides: 
developers and users on board, partly using optimal pricing mechanisms, and grow the 
ecosystem through two-sided network externalities (Rochet and Tirole 2003, 2006, 
Cusumano et al. 2002, Iansiti and Levien 2004, Cusumano 2010, Gawer 2010). 
Developers are complementors to the platform –they are neither platform’s employees 
nor their component suppliers through arms-length contracts. Developers depend on a
platform’s services such as Software Development Kit (SDK) and Application 
Programming Interface (APIs) in order to obtain access to the hardware and operating 
system and write complementary application or services (Evans and Schmalensee 2007, 
Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2011). These services form the foundation for a platform’s 
technology-based governance over third-party developers, a classic consideration of 
which is the level of intellectual property openness of the platform (West 2003, Boudreau 
2010, Eisenmann et al. 2009). As a result, software platform constitutes the first
component of third-party developers’ resource environment. Aside from technological 
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reliance on the platform, third-party developers operate in a free market with typical 
economic conditions, where strategic behaviors are desired. Boudreau (2012) 
demonstrates that increased number of developers tend to reduce innovation incentives in 
the PDA market, hence an evidence of the crowding-out effect in a competitive market.
Through a study of enterprise software industry, Huang, Ceccagnoli, Forman and Wu 
(2013) show that third-party developers with a greater stock of formal intellectual 
property rights (such as patents and copyrights), and those with stronger downstream 
capabilities (as measured by trademarks and consulting services) are more likely to 
protect themselves against the threat of platform expropriation. In studying relationship 
between first mover advantage and environmental characteristics in the iPhone app 
market, Srinivasan and Suarez (2009) discover that early entrants outperform late entrants, 
and entry timing is more important in higher growth rate genres and for incumbent rather 
than new developers. These findings suggest that there is a second component of third-
party developers’ resource environment, which is formed by developers’ economic 
environment. Furthermore, these two parts of resource environment are interconnected –
platform policies and its market performance such as installed base can influence third-
party developers’ market dynamics, competitor types, and customer base. Therefore, it 
would be more precise to say that developers operate in a semiautonomous economy. To 
the best of my knowledge, no studies have discussed the effect of platform governance 
and developers’ own economy at the same time, thus identifying these would be a 
contribution of this research. 
The platform-developer relationship warrants a little more discussion. On the one 
hand, developers are a platform’s external innovation assets and are governed through 
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technological design and pricing mechanisms. On the other hand, because software 
platforms are private companies, they tend to engage in certain strategic actions and exert
rules and regulations over developers, which are “distorted away from pure value 
creation in the ecosystem, and towards actions that lead to higher platform profits” 
(Boudreau and Hagiu 2009: 170). In other words, platforms’ priorities are to protect their 
own interests, secure their competitive positions or protect interests of end users, and they 
can be in conflict with developers’ interests and goals. First and foremost, platforms have
incentives to enter developers’market (Gawer and Henderson 2007) or fold third-party 
innovation into the platform (Parker and Van Alstyne 2012). If the platform releases a 
similar application with a third-party offering and bundles it with the operating system, 
users can obtain it for free and thus do not have to purchase it from the third-party 
developer. Secondly, platforms restrict developers’ access to the platform for quality 
assurance purpose. This approach is most commonly seen in the video game industry. 
Expansion of size on the developer side can result in congestion and crowding (Boudreau
2012), and consumers’search cost can increase due to information asymmetry between 
consumers and developers. In order to reduce consumers’ search cost, platforms thus 
engage in centralized “quality certification”via prescreening developers (Boudreau et al.
2009, Gallagher and Park 2002, Evans et al. 2007). These screening policies usually only 
grant certain elite game development shops opportunities to write video console games. 
Besides developer prescreening, platforms also screen products and decide whether or not 
they are qualified for release. Apple’s app review policy on the iOS App Store is the best 
example and its inconsistency and lack of transparency attracts much outcry from the 
developer community (Bergvall-Kåreborn, Howcroft and Chincholle 2010). Lastly, 
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platform’s regulation is also manifested in restrictions on user-complementor interaction. 
Direct interactions between complementors and end users not through the platform can 
harm platform’s economic interests (Rochet et al. 2003, 2006), or affect the effectiveness 
of the idiosyncratic activities the platform is designed to perform. This approach is 
adopted mostly by platforms who are market exchange owners; it is relevant for the
discussion here because the platform governance change observed in this study is a 
software platform also taking on the role as a market exchange owner. Boudreau et al. 
(2009) show that TopCoder, a vendor for competition-based software outsourcing, 
prohibits interactions between developers and final customers to ensure that the software 
development in the contest be a sequential and planned process. It is worth noting that 
platforms’ rules and regulations described above resemble behavior control mechanisms
in the organizational control theory (Kirsch 1996, 1997), where behavior control means 
that “specific rules and procedures are articulated, which, if followed, will lead to desired 
outcomes” (Kirsch 1997: 217). However, as Tiwana et al. (2010) suggest, “the 
relationship between platform owners and third-party developers is not the classical 
principal-agent relationship (i.e., the platform owner does not hire developers to do a task 
specified by the former), as assumed in the control theory. It is plausible that the role of 
control mechanisms then is one of coordination rather than mitigating agency hazards, as 
control theorists widely assume” (p680). As will be shown later, platforms’ strategic 
actions, especially their rules and regulations help explain the dynamics between 




In order to examine questions regarding third-party developers’ institutional logic 
and the impact of their resource environment on the logic, I chose to study independent 
developers of Apple’s desktop platform: Mac indies during the 2001 to 2012 time span. 
2001 marked the year when Mac OS X, Apple’s new operating system4 was introduced to 
the world after founder Steve Jobs returned to Apple. The time also coincided with the 
dot-com bust, which left many software developers unemployed, but also a relatively 
mature online payment infrastructure grown during the Internet bubble. The availability 
of a cool new technology, free development tools5, and an online distribution channel 
sparked a wave of entrepreneurship where small or individual developers form business 
writing Mac apps and selling them through the Internet (Meeteren 2008). As I will show 
in detail in the findings section, over the years, these Mac indie developers formed an 
institutional logic based on their professional conduct, and relationship with the platform 
and the market. Up until March 2008, Apple had mainly governed third-party developers 
with its role as a technology platform. A change occurred on March 6, 2008. With the 
announcement of the iPhone SDK, Apple also announced the App Store, the exclusive 
distribution channel for the iPhone apps, and later the iPad apps (hence the iOS App 
Store). In October 2010, Apple announced the Mac App Store (MAS), a market place 
with identical design features as the iOS App Store, but for Mac applications. A major 
difference between policies regarding the two stores is that the MAS is not the exclusive 
                                                          
4 Mac OS X is based on NeXTSTEP, the operating system from Steve Job’s company: NeXT, founded in 
1985 after he was forced out of Apple.
5 Before OS X, becoming an Apple software developer required an investment of around 1,100 dollars on 
third party software like Codewarrier (Meeteren 2008:23)
66
distribution channel for developers as the iOS App Store. With Apple extending its 
governance terrain to the market place in addition to technologies, the incumbent Mac 
indie developers had to cope with many changes. Besides, a new group of Mac 
developers appeared, many of whom come from iOS development. Over time, a new
logic emerged.  
Data and analysis
Table 1 illustrates the data sources and analytical process. Following the argument 
that narrative and vocabularies reflect the underlying process for the emergence and 
change of institutional logic (Thornton et al. 2012), and based on the role of historical 
research in analyzing field-level institutional logics (e.g., Thornton and Ocasio 1999, 
Thornton 2002, Lounsbury 2002, 2007, Marquis and Lounsbury 2007), I rely on publicly 
available online data sources of the Mac indie community, iOS-turned Mac developers, 
sources on Apple’s culture and policies, and existing studies on Mac and iOS developers
for this research. While most data sources cover the period between 2004 and 2012, an 
ethnographic study on Mac indies by Meeteren (2008)6 and an oral history project on 
Mac culture provide data between 2001 and 2004. I use qualitative approach with an 
interpretive philosophy (Klein and Myers 1999) to derive Mac indies’ institutional logics. 
Because institutional logic is concerned with social actors’practices and meaning system, 
an interpretivism epistemology fits perfectly because it is to “understand how members of 
a social group, through their participation in social processes, enact their particular 
realities and endow them with meaning, and to show how these meanings, beliefs and 
intentions of the members help to constitute their social action” (Orlikowski and Baroudi
1991:13). Furthermore, I follow Nigam et al. (2010) by combining a narrative and 
                                                          
6 Although this is an undergraduate thesis, this study is widely recognized among the Mac indie community. 
67
content analysis in studying the research questions. Specifically, I derive ideal types of 
developers’ institutional logics before and after platform’s governance change, explicate 
characteristics of developers’ resource environment, use content analysis to quantitatively 
show the logic shift pattern over time, and analyze the relationship between the societal-
level logics to elucidate the dynamics between the two logics at the field level. In the 
following section, I detail the process of ideal type construction and content analysis. 
Dynamics between the two logics will be illustrated in the findings section. 
Ideal types, established by Max Weber (1904), is a typological construct for theory 
building and modeling (Doty and Glick 1994). According to Weber (1904), ideal types
are “formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the 
synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent 
concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly 
emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct” (Via Coser, 1977:223-224). 
Ideal types are the commonly used formal analytic models to compare empirical 
observations across institutional order; therefore, they are best developed at least in pairs, 
if not multiple characterizations (Thornton et al. 2008: 119). As mentioned in the theory 
section, the societies are organized by cultural subsystems or interinstitutional orders
(Friedland et al. 1991), and each of the institutional orders or logics is composed of 
elemental categories, which represent the cultural symbols and material practices 
particular to that order. The elemental categories are established social-science concepts, 
some of which are derived from Weber (1922/1978). In explicating the cultural 
emergence model of field-level institutional logics, Thornton et al. (2012) maintain that 
the key constructs in the model, such as symbolic representations, practices, and 
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vocabularies of practice are all categorical elements of institutional logics (150). For the 
current study, I use ideal types to construct field-level logics, and incorporate the key 
constructs in the cultural emergence model through discussions of the elemental 
categories. Table 2a illustrates the interinstitutional system ideal types developed initially
in Thornton and Ocasio (1999), then extended in Thornton (2004), Thornton et al. (2005), 
and Thornton et al. (2012). Table 2b shows an example of ideal types of field-level logic 
in architecture (Thornton et al. 2005: 144). It is worth noting that “the elemental 
categories on the vertical Y-axis are not exhaustive and can vary in terms of which ones 
are most salient to the researcher’s questions and research context” (Thornton et al. 2012: 
59). 
I draw on data sources related to incumbent Mac developers, Mac culture and 
existing research on Mac developers (e.g. Meeteren 2008) to construct ideal types for the 
logic prior to platform’s governance change. To construct ideal types for the new logic, I 
examine data sources related to incumbent Mac developers’ changes, iOS-turned Mac 
developers, and existing studies on iOS developers (e.g., Qiu et al. 2012, Meeteren 2009, 
Bergvall-Kåreborn et al. 2010). The assumption is that Mac developers’ new institutional 
logic is composed of iOS-turned Mac developers’ practices and belief systems, as well as
incumbent Mac developers’ changes in practices and belief systems in response to both 
the iOS App Store and the Mac App Store (MAS). This assumption is grounded in the 
following observations. First and foremost, the two App Stores share design attributes 
from the platform and their impact on the customer base. Second, the iOS-turned Mac 
developers would inadvertently carry their practices from the iOS App Store to the MAS, 
and thus influence the market dynamics and other players, including the incumbent Mac 
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developers. Thirdly, incumbent Mac developers have obtained direct or indirect 
experiences with the iOS App Store, so they would anchor their perceptions about and 
actions on the MAS based on previous knowledge. Lastly, media or opinion leaders, who 
observe Apple as a whole, tend to formulate predictions of the new store based on the old, 
and their conjectures would influence developers’ subsequent actions.   
My first step was coding one of the data sources –discussions topics on the major 
Mac indie listserv: MacSB on Yahoo! Groups. I traced the discussion from its inception: 
1/29/2004 to 12/31/2012, the end of my data collection, in a 9-year span. I divided 
listserv threads into 3 time periods in accord with Apple’s governance change to examine 
the temporal shift in developers’ attention and discussions. The first phase is from 
1/29/2004 till 3/5/2008, the second phase is from 3/6/2008, when the iOS App Store was 
announced, till 10/19/2010; and the third-phase is between 10/20/2010, when the Mac 
App Store was announced, and 12/31/2012. I expect developers’ logic change to appear 
in phase 2, and blossom in phase 3. Due to the high number of total messages on the 
listserv (close to 20,000)7, I coded the first message in a given thread and used that to 
represent the subject discussed in that thread. This assumption is justified by the hidden 
profile theory, which suggests that members of a discussion session tend to be biased on 
the information initially shared in the dialogue (Stasser 1992). I also tried to mitigate the 
limitation of this assumption with the large number of threads coded. After removing off-
topic threads such as occasional technical discussions and trolls, threads with no or only 
one reply or activity organizing threads, I coded in total 1,264 threads. This number is 
                                                          
7 This number might not be big in terms of number of messages per month. However, it is worth noting that 
this is a business-oriented discussion list for Mac developers. Lists with technical focus have much more 
traffic in comparison. I also checked other non-technical discussion list, such as the UI-design group, and 
the traffic is a lot less than this business-oriented list.
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comparable to that in existing literature which uses listserv as data source (c.f. 
Orlikowski and Yates, 1994, Kuk 2006, Kudaravalli and Faraj 2008)8.
To map the comprehensiveness of the elemental categories in ideal types, and to 
explicate characteristics of the resource environment of Mac developers’ institutional 
logic, I adopt the stakeholder perspective (Donaldson and Preston 1995, Jones and Wicks 
1999, Agle, Mitchell and Sonnenfeld 1999) as a general coding framework to identify 
developers’ practices and interpretations in relation to their stakeholders. A much cited 
definition of stakeholders is “those groups without whose support the organization would 
cease to exist”(Stanford Research Institute (SRI) 1963, quoted in Donaldson and Preston 
1995: 72). My use of the stakeholder perspective is mainly at the descriptive and 
empirical level, which suits exploration of the new areas (Donaldson et al. 1995: 70-71), 
such as my case. I also went a step further to analyzing the focal organizational entity 
itself –developers’ own identity and practices. Together, five categories emerged. Three 
of them are related to developers’ stakeholders: the platform, customers and infrastructure 
service providers. The rest two are market competition and developers’ entrepreneurial 
strategies, and developers’ identity and routine tasks. Figure 1 shows the stakeholder 
coding framework.
I combined the deductive and inductive coding approach in analyzing the listserv 
threads. For the deductive part, I relied on the platform governance literature and 
ethnography about Mac indies by Meeteren (2008) to code developers’relationship with 
the platform and developers’ identity and drew on studies on iOS app developers (Qiu et 
al. 2012, Meeteren 2009, Bergvall-Kåreborn et al. 2010) to guide my coding on the new 
logic. I also allowed themes to emerge during the coding process. To start off coding, I 
                                                          
8 The average number of messages coded in these studies is around 1000.
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sampled about 800 threads across three phases to construct a coding scheme. To explicate
the emergence of new logic, I used themes generated in the 1st phase as a baseline, and 
then carefully compared the meaning of developers’ messages in phase 2 and 3 with the 
existing themes. Following previous literature (e.g., Ruef 1999, Reay and Hinings 2005), 
which maintains that the new logic can reflect in the changing meaning of an existing 
theme or in a new theme, I formed a coding rule where any new meanings attached to the 
existing themes or brand new themes were classified as the new institutional logic 
attributed to the platform governance change. For instance, theme “platform’s entry into 
developers’ turf”means “market and product clash” before platform’s change, while it 
means “distribution channel clash” afterwards. By the same token, theme “platform’s
rules and regulations”mainly indicates legal rules before the change, and it means 
administrative and technical rules afterwards. The original expectation was that the 
incumbent logic would consist of 100% of discussion topics in phase 1, and the new logic 
would start to appear in phase 2. However, while comparing the findings about the iOS 
app developers with Mac developers’ practices in phase 1, I found that two forms of 
practices which belong to the new logic: “frequent app launch to gain visibility”and 
“aggregating sales from small apps”were already present in phase 1. This is because, as 
will be discussed in details in the findings section, one characteristic of the new logic is 
that the centralized distribution channel and platform’s store design and policies 
incentivize developers to adopt a form of “hit”-oriented strategy. Prior to Apple’s App 
Store, there are several third-party app aggregators, such as Version Tracker and 
MacUpdate where developers list their apps. While they are not run by the platform, they 
induce similar hit-oriented behaviors from developers. Therefore, for the two themes, and 
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only these two themes in the category “market competition and developers’ 
entrepreneurial strategies”: “app portfolio strategy” and “frequent releasing strategy”, 
their meaning underwent change even prior to the platform governance change. These 
two themes mean “app diversification” and “marketing coordination or obtaining 
feedback” respectively in the incumbent logic. It is worth pointing out that not all themes
change meaning after the platform change strikes, and not all App Store-related 
discussions fall under the new logic. In addition, the original logic continued to exist in 
phase 2 and 3. This is because developers were either discussing apps released in their 
traditional outlets, or they were still following the original logic even for App Store apps. 
An example would be the theme “platform choice” in the market and strategy category. 
Regardless of which distribution channel a developer adopts, s/he always needs to 
consider the issue of targeting just one platform or more. Based on the characteristics of 
the logics, the logic before the platform governance change was named “software 
ecosystem logic”, and the one after the change was named “platform ecosystem logic”. 
Regarding the coding process, I followed Strauss and Corbin’s approach (1998). I 
first used open coding to generate properties and dimensions of themes through 
constantly comparing the existing themes with information in the new threads. This was 
followed by an axial coding process to extract the sub-themes, namely the condition, 
interaction, cause and consequences of themes. Last step was selective coding, which 
includes integrating and refining themes, subthemes and their positions in each of the five
categories. Extensive memos were taken and assisted the coding process. After the first 
round was completed, I discussed the coding scheme with the research team, clarified 
different interpretations and adjusted the scheme. Then, I recoded all threads one more 
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time. The coding scheme continued to evolve until all threads were coded. To validate the 
coding framework, inter-coder reliability test was performed. A research assistant coded 
10% of the threads in each of the three phases. 15 threads were used for training in each 
phase and disagreement in the interpretation was discussed. Some coding differences 
were due to the specific knowledge about the Mac business or software development.
Cohen’s kappa was used to calculate level of agreement, because it takes into account the 
agreement occurring by chance (Viera and Garrett 2005). The final Cohen’s kappa is 0.75, 
which indicates good agreement and above the threshold of 0.70 suggested for content 
analysis (Neuendorf 2002, Krippendorff 2004). A complete coding scheme is included in 
Table 11 in the Appendix.
To triangulate the listserv data, I also drew on supplemental online archival sources. 
Snowball and theoretical sampling were used to obtain these data (Miles and Huberman 
1994, Strauss and Corbin 1998). I started with blog posts mentioned in the listserv 
discussions, blogs by established Mac or iOS developers in the community, and well-
known industry press, and then expanded data sources from there. Theoretical sampling 
was also used. For instance, I selected blog posts from developers who differ in opinions, 
strategies and performances on the Mac App Store. In addition, I searched data based on 
critical issues about platform’s policies which stirred heated debate among the developer 
community and the press, such as Apple’s issuance of the App Store review guidelines, 
Apple’s changing policies towards Adobe Flash, and Apple’s policies of Sandboxing and 
Gatekeeper. Data searching process ended when no new information emerged. This 
search resulted in 77 pieces of text composed of developer blog posts, industry press 
articles from MacWorld, macstories, Engadget and The Verge; oral history narratives on 
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Mac culture from Folklore.org –a project dedicated to the development of the original 
Macintosh, Apple’s official iOS and Mac App Store review guidelines, transcripts of 
developers’ pod casts and presentations from the now deceased C4 conference for Mac 
indies. Most of these data are to make up for the listserv data in the relatively short time 
span in phase 3, among which ten pieces of texts are on iOS-turned Mac developers’ 
strategies on the Mac App Store. In the meantime, nine pieces of texts are about Mac 
developers’ reactions to Apple’s iOS policies, hence for phase 2; and 13 pieces of texts 
are for phase 1. These texts were coded using the same coding scheme derived from the 
listserv discussion, and only one new theme emerged: “platform organizational learning”, 
characterized by developers’ reflections on the resemblance between Apple’s App Stores
with its music store: the iTunes. This led me to collect additional six pieces of texts on 
Apple’s iTunes, including one academic study, one press article, two press interviews 
with Steve Jobs, and two YouTube videos of Steve Jobs’ presentations about the iTunes. 
Finally, I mapped themes developed from the listserv discussion and supplemental texts, 
and existing studies on Mac and iOS developers to the elemental categories to construct 
the ideal types. Table 11 provides detailed explanation of the mapping process. 
In addition to ideal type construction, I also used coding results from the listserv 
discussions to quantitatively demonstrate developers’ temporal shift in logics. Due to data 
availability, while multiple sources about incumbent Mac developers, iOS-turned Mac 
developers and existing studies were used to construct the ideal types of the two logics, 
only listserv discussions were used to quantitatively capture Mac developers’ logic shift 
over time. Therefore in the content analysis, the new logic (platform ecosystem logic) 
only reflects incumbent Mac developers’ change, and does not include practices and 
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belief systems of iOS-turned Mac developers. As mentioned earlier, based on the 
stakeholder coding framework, I derived five broad categories of developers’ stakeholder 
relationship and their identity and practices. I examine developers’ logic shift in two 
aspects: change of distribution of two logics in each category over time, and change of 
percentage of each category over time. For each phase in each of the five categories, I
calculated frequency of each theme through aggregating lower-level themes for the two
logics. Then, I calculated the percentage score for the two logics in each phase. Then for 
instance if in phase 2 of any given category, the frequency for software ecosystem logic 
was 40, and that for platform ecosystem logic was 10, then software ecosystem logic 
constituted 80% of developers’ discussion topics in phase 2 for this category, and 
platform ecosystem logic constituted 20%. Over time from phase 1 to phase 3, I thus 
observed the changing distribution between the two logics for any given category due to 
platform’s governance change. I also calculated the percentage score of each category in 
each phase. For example, if 100 instances were coded for each of the 5 categories in 
phase 1, then each category equally constituted 20% of developers’discussion topics in 
phase 1. Over time, the percentage score revealed the changing pattern of developers’ 
attention on their stakeholder relationship as well as their identity and strategies because 
of platform’s governance change. 
Findings
Findings are presented in three parts. First I delineate two ideal types of Mac indies’ 
institutional logics before and after platform’s governance change and their relationships
with the resource environment. Secondly, I corroborate the logic change with results from 
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the content analysis. Thirdly, I analyze the status of the two logics by elucidating their
relationship at the societal level.
Ideal types of Mac developers’ institutional logics
Table 3 presents the ideal types of two logics. As noted in the methods section, 
Thornton et al. (2012) maintain that the elemental categories for ideal types of the 
institutional logic reflect the key constructs in the cultural emergence model. Among the 
elemental categories in the current study, except for “basis of attention”, which entails
mostly material practices, the other categories contain both material practices and 
symbolic meanings. Figure 3 shows the resource environment for the two logics and how 
the platform part of the resource environment influences developers’ economy part of the 
resource environment. I integrate discussion of the resource environment with discussion 
of the institutional logic. In the end of the description of each logic, relationship between 
resource environment and institutional will be again summarized. 
Individual developers started to write and disseminate their software almost three 
decades ago. Developers distributed their software as “shareware”, initially through dial-
up bulletin boards or via disks given away with computer magazines, and later via the 
Internet. Users can try a piece of software free of charge, and then send a check to 
developers to purchase a registration license of the full version of the software (The 
Economist 2004). However, making a living out of shareware was hardly attainable under 
a rudimentary distribution and payment system (Takeyama 1994). Despite that, writing 
commercial applications and selling directly to users have long been dreams for many 
individual developers. This dream was made possible at the turn of the 21st century, 
thanks to a maturing e-commerce and online payment infrastructure. Among the many 
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homebrew developers of various platforms, those writing applications for Mac, Apple’s 
desktop computers, grew into a significant number. 
Gradually from 2001 to 2008, a software ecosystem logic was formed for Mac indies. 
This logic is a hybridized mix of the professional and market logic, and is guided by the 
personal and market capitalism. The market logic here is characterized by indie 
developers’ specialist position in the market through exploitation of periphery of the 
resource space. The resource partitioning theory posits that as the level of concentration 
in a market rises, generalist firms tend to become larger and more general and exploit 
resources available at the market center –the more generic consumer demand or 
mainstream taste preferences of consumers. This leaves resources located outside the 
generalist target areas for specialist firms. These firms, which tend to be small in scale,
can exploit periphery of the resource space –the niche markets, without directly 
competing with the larger generalists (Carroll 1985, Carroll and Swaminathan 2000, 
Swaminathan 2001). Among third-party Mac software companies, Mac indies are the 
specialist firms. They are shy of marketing and distribution resources necessary to reach 
mass market users as a generalist firm does, but they produce niche software and exploit 
periphery of the customer base. In contrast, companies like Microsoft and Adobe, 
including platform Apple itself produce generalist software, which target center of the 
market. Specialist firms’ scale limitation however is remedied by platform’s governance 
change, as will be discussed later. 
Under the software ecosystem logic, developers’ identity is characterized by their 
awareness of being third-party complementors to a platform, and their value on
independence as a business owner. A popular analogy among the Mac indie community is 
78
that they are the “sharecropper” to Apple. Developers’app sales are highly reliant on 
platform’s market share and installed base, and they face the risk of platform entering 
their product turf some day9. If product competition with the platform does occur, 
developers would produce a power user version of Apple’s app in order to avoid market 
clash (Meeteren 2008). This essentially drives developers to further target periphery of 
the market, which tends to consist of hard-core Mac users, consumers with specialized 
needs or developers themselves. Mac indie’s identity is at the same time strongly defined 
by the independence aspect. Developers cherish the autonomy of being their own boss, 
having a big say over the business, and resisting the bureaucracy of working for a 
“BigCo”. They normally bootstrap the business without taking external funding, and 
command the freedom in choosing the kind of technology for writing apps. Sources of 
legitimacy come from quality of apps, reputation of developers and platform recognition. 
Mac indie’s emphasis on quality is highly influenced by platform Apple’s meticulous 
attention to detail on aesthetics and user interface design. Such artistic pursuit was passed 
down from the design philosophy of the original Macintosh. As Andy Hertzfeld, one of 
the original Macintosh team members recalled, “The Macintosh was driven by artistic 
values, oblivious to competition, where the goal was to be transcendently brilliant and 
insanely great. We wanted the Macintosh to be a technical and artistic tour-de-force that 
pushed the state of the art in every conceivable dimension.”Customers are also an 
important force in shaping app quality. Developers convey that Mac users are more likely 
to search for and purchase third-party software from smaller developers than those of 
other platforms. Mac users, like developers themselves, tend to be immersed in the 
                                                          
9 The Watson history was a famous anecdote among indie community. Watson was software which was 
built to complement a piece of Apple’s software. Shortly after Watson won an Apple Design Award in 2002, 
Apple released a new version of Sherlock that incorporated many of Watson’s features (Meeteren 2008: 60). 
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cultural meanings of Mac experience and have a sense of taste (Meeteren 2008). Their 
high bar for quality thus pushes developers to hone in the app experience even further.
Moreover, Mac software-related media outlets endorse quality apps through ratings, 
reviews and awards. In the Mac community, famous developers are frequently quoted and 
their success stories are widely shared. Some earned their reputation from being former 
NeXT consultants and Apple employees. Others became popular because of their 
craftsmanship in apps and leadership in the community. Developers’ tight-knit
community and being consumers of each others’ products enhance the reputation system. 
Legitimacy also comes from platform’s recognition. Apple hands out the Apple Design 
Awards (ADA) at yearly developer conference: WWDC and winning ADA significantly 
boosts the amount of peer recognition in the community (Meeteren 2008). Additionally, 
Apple used to dedicate a webpage to listing third-party apps, and being featured there is 
deemed great honor, not to mention the associated sales bump. For Mac indies, the 
authority includes their skills and capabilities in producing apps with high engineering 
and design qualities, as well as the level of market acceptance towards an app. As a 
community of practice (Brown and Duguid 2001), developers form norms regarding how 
members should behave during the socializing process. Following the principle of 
reciprocity, a developer earns credit in the community by helping others that later can be 
“exchanged”if he or she needs help (Meeteren 2008). Mac indies pay particular attention 
to the etiquette in dealing with competitors in public. Developers have a general 
consensus that their products are differentiating and not competing with each other. If 
they need to list feature comparison with a competing product, they make sure to be 
considerate of the counterpart and act in good faith and good taste. Competition on price 
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incentives is not encouraged and direct product imitation is frowned upon (Meeteren 
2008). When indies set out to start the business, their mission is to do something they 
love, keep the business sustainable and increase sales. To do so, they focus their attention 
on resolving entrepreneurial challenges, implementing infrastructure services best suited 
for the business and adapting to platform’s system progress and technology change. 
Piracy is unavoidable in the software industry. Indies have mixed feelings towards their 
apps being cracked –they are upset and angry and yet feel flattered at the same time. 
Developers differ in dealing with piracy –some design better licensing schemes to reduce 
the likelihood of future piracy; others choose to stop the cat-and-mouse chasing and try to 
educate end-users and turn them into paying customers. Besides piracy, Mac indies face 
many additional entrepreneurial challenges. For example, developers need to make 
decisions on multi-platform or cross-platform development, revenue models, strategies 
on pricing, product portfolio and product releasing. Among others, marketing and PR is
one of the most critical issue developers face. While “echo-chamber” marketing through 
developer and press endorsement create word of mouth effect among developer 
themselves or power users (Meeteren 2008), reaching a wider audience requires standard 
marketing techniques such as advertising, price promotions, branding and tools 
connecting with customers. While Internet is indie developers’ major distribution channel, 
they also leverage other distribution options. For instance, developers distribute apps 
through physical CDs, offer site licenses or family packs, sell through retail stores, 
collaborate with resellers, and participate in magazine promotions or bundled sales 
promotions. Under the software ecosystem logic, not only do developers need to make 
decisions directly related to their business strategies, but they are also accountable for 
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their relationship with stakeholders, namely, customers, infrastructure providers and the 
platform. Small company size allows Mac indies to add a personal touch in tech support. 
Customers would receive a support email signed with developers’ name rather than name 
of a company division. In the meantime, developers also try to balance the personal and 
professional side of the business. To make support more efficient, they streamline the 
process with various support tools and issue tracking systems. Indie business relies 
heavily on market service providers, such as app aggregators, e-commerce and payment 
providers, hosting services, update and publishing service providers. Under the software 
ecosystem logic, developers’ attention towards Apple is mainly centered around the 
impact of platform’s system change and upgrade on third-party development. For 
instance, developers need to decide between backward compatibility to support 
customers of old operating systems and embracing the new OS to leverage more platform 
features. The biggest technical change developers encountered during the observation 
period was Apple’s switching from IBM PowerPC chips to Intel chips in 200510. This 
caused huge uproar among the developer community: developers were concerned that 
Mac would lose its character and become just like any mass-consumed Wintel machines. 
A bigger impact however, was that developers had to convert their code to be compatible 
with the new system throughout the transition period. Under the software ecosystem logic, 
basis of strategy is an organic growth model. Developers write apps targeting serious 
customers for long-term use. They maintain an average price range of $20 to $50 per 
piece of software, because developers attach great importance on price as it represents the
                                                          
10 The official reason for Apple to switch to Intel was power consumption. PowerPC was not able to 
provide the level of performance per watt that Apple needed for its light systems, such as notebooks and 




value of their work. After the first version of an app is released, developers continue to 
fix bugs and enhance features to both strengthen the existing customer base and cultivate
new ones. Under software logic, platform-developer coordination is conducted through 
both informal and formal mechanisms. Developers convey that Apple’s development 
environment is more stable and has created more productive programming environment 
for developers compared to Windows. Besides, Apple’s original innovativeness culture is 
influential to third-party developers so that they love to be creative with the Mac. Again 
as Andy Hertzfeld recalled, “the best thing about the Apple II was the spirit of its 
creation. It was not conceived or designed as a product in the usual sense; it was just 
Steve Wozniak trying to impress himself and his friends. Most of the early Apple 
employees were their own ideal customers… Its unique spirit was picked up and echoed 
back by third party developers, who sprung out of nowhere with innovative applications.”
In addition to such cultural and affective properties, Apple connects employees and 
executives with developers through the evangelism team (Meeteren 2008). In the 
meantime, Apple also maintains a membership-based, formal developer relationship 
program (Apple Developer Connection, or ADC) accessible to everyone. And it regulates 
developers through legal tools, enforcing rules on use of platform trademark and 
administering NDA. 
The above ideal-type attributes of software ecosystem logic demonstrate that both 
societal-level professional and market logic are in effect here. Mac indie developers need 
to solve engineering and design problems, and their reputation system and platform 
coordination mechanisms reward apps with high quality. In the meantime, developers 
target specialist market and need to resolve entrepreneurial challenges. Under software 
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ecosystem logic, Apple as resource environment provides the hardware, operating system, 
development tools and design guidelines to developers. It also influences developers with 
its innovative spirit and artistic pride in software design. Resource environment within 
developers’ own economy comprises the Internet as a distribution channel, proliferation 
of infrastructure service providers and software technologies. Developers’customer base 
is mainly composed of those who have the need for and knowledge about specialized 
third-party software, such as power users, Mac enthusiasts or other developers. This 
resource environment not only facilitates Mac indies to run viable software business, it 
also helps developers to build a strong identity of independence. It is worth noting that 
developers’customer base is partially influenced by the potential threat of platform
entering third-party developers’product market, which indicates that the platform 
component of the resource environment influences the developers’ economy component 
of the resource environment. Under software ecosystem logic, platform’s impact on third-
party developers’market dynamics, such as market competition, and their market 
strategies is minimal, if not none. 
A change in developers’ resource environment occurred on March 6, 2008. Along 
with the announcement of the iPhone SDK (software development kit), Apple also 
introduced the App Store, the exclusive market place to distribute the iPhone and later the 
iPad apps. This platform’s governance change marked the beginning of Apple as a 
technology platform entering the domain of software distribution, enacting the role as a 
market exchange owner. It also harbingered a different developers’logic –platform 
ecosystem logic to arise. On October 20, 2010, Apple announced the Mac App Store 
(MAS), a same market place as the iOS App Store, but for desktop applications, and the 
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MAS is not the exclusive channel. As noted in the methods section, the platform 
ecosystem logic is analyzed through an integration of developers’practices and symbolic 
constructions built around both the iOS App Store and the Mac App Store. 
The platform ecosystem logic is a hybridization of corporate and market logic, and it 
is guided by the managerial and market capitalism. Here the corporate logic stems from 
platform’s technical and administrative policies for developers. The market logic is 
characterized by indie developers’ generalist position on the market, and this is strongly 
influenced by the design and attributes of a platform-controlled market place. Platform 
Apple has in three ways assisted Mac indie developers in taking on the role as a 
generalist without actually being one –indie developers are still of small-scale, but they 
are able to leverage center of the resource space as generalist firms do with the help of 
the platform. First, the App Store has legitimized and popularized software consumption 
through increasing average consumers’ knowledge about and demand for software. 
Shopping for software is no longer an activity only for power users; it becomes a mass 
market phenomenon. An experienced developer shared his observation: “I was just 
amazed by how popular it was, people just loved apps. I've been in software forever, and 
I've never seen, the kind of response to software, which is really weird.”And because 
these new users are mostly average users, they tend to have mainstream preferences for 
apps as opposed to geeky ones. Therefore they form center of the resource space which 
appeals to generalists. Secondly, the App Store creates a mass distribution channel for 
developers to reach a much larger user base that they were not able to in the past –the 
App Store essentially solves the scale issue critical for a firm to function as a generalist. 
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Thirdly, the App Store design, especially its top charts feature, incentivizes developers to 
write mass-appeal apps and target center of the market space. 
Under this logic, developers’ identity is that of subordinate third-party developer 
entrepreneur. Apple as an exchange place owner created administrative and technical 
rules that developers need to adhere to. From App Store developer enrollment status to 
app review process, Mac indies experienced unprecedented organizational bureaucracy in 
releasing an app to the market. Apple performs “centralized quality certification” (Hagiu 
2009) through a review process. However, unlike game console companies, who filter out 
developers before a game is created, Apple rejects apps after they are created. And as 
Apple itself is learning, their review guidelines were long time missing, and the 
inconsistency in the review results is frequently reported. Even after the guidelines were
published, they were subject to change. This led to much frustration among developers; 
they feel that they cannot trust the platform and are losing control over their apps and 
even their business. Furthermore, developers need to abide by Apple’s technology 
requirement for producing apps, be it programming languages or APIs. Many Mac indie’s 
existing applications cannot be sold through the App Store simply because they will 
violate the guidelines. Developers expressed their chagrin in listserv discussions about 
their increased dependency on the platform: 
“For Indies this is really bad news, as we are forced into the Mac App Store and its 
dictatorship rules: content censorship, technology lock-in and revenue sharing.” 
“Is this worth it? Nimble development has always been something I've taken pride in, 
but the App Store process is the very antithesis of nimble. It's slow, bureaucratic, and 
opaque. And for what? Is the sales increase worth it?” 
“So, the big question is, will you see RA applications in the Mac App Store? Right 
now, we don’t know. With Apple’s onerous guidelines, most of our applications would not 
be approved. Even if they would be, however, are the benefits good enough to give up 
being a truly independent software developer?”
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Under platform logic, developers’ legitimacy is derived from App Store chart ranking,
platform recognition and end users’ reviews and ratings. Design of the App Store layout 
makes various app charts and Apple’s featuring sections particularly salient and 
accessible. Users tend to correlate higher app ranking with better app quality, and 
developers would also show respect to those who have apps with high rankings. Apple’s 
featuring lists act as platform’s official endorsement and significantly increase legitimacy 
of featured apps. User rating and reviews are a form of “decentralized quality 
certification” (Hagiu 2009), and higher user evaluation adds considerable credibility on
an app for potential buyers. Sources of authority stem from platform’s review and end 
user interests. On the App Store, every app goes through a review process before being 
published, and as alluded to earlier, Apple employs its power in deciding app 
qualifications. Developers convey a sense of fear about Apple’s potential disapproval of 
apps, and they frequently exchange information with each other about the “suitability” of 
an app before submission. The other source for authority is end user interests. On the 
scale with consumers and developers on each side, Apple as a platform tilts the scale 
towards consumers. Many of Apple’s policies are designed to protect user experience and 
security, but they do not always benefit developers. For instance, Apple’s App Store 
review guidelines have detailed items on banning apps related to personal attacks, with 
objectionable content and pornography, and those offending religion, culture, and 
ethnicity. This is certainly commendable act from a user’s standpoint, but Apple 
reviewers’subjectivity and inconsistency often results in unfairness, and thus hurts 
developers’interest. Apple recently implemented two policies to protect end user security.
While the sandboxing policy has caused much turmoil among the developer community 
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because many have to relinquish certain app features or withdraw apps from the Mac App 
Store, the Gatekeeper policy keeps end users safe without upsetting developers. Under 
platform ecosystem logic, basis of norms is developers’ self-interest and dependency on 
the platform. Developers tend to behave as if their goal is mainly to exploit profits from 
the App Store market, and Apple is seen more as an authoritative boss instead of a
platform providing core technologies. Developers’ mission is to build competitive 
position of apps on top charts, and write apps to be favored by the platform. Some 
developers deliberately update apps according to platform’s OS upgrade cycle with a 
hope that their apps, which show off the latest platform technology, will be featured on 
the App Store. Under platform ecosystem logic, developers’ basis of attention is standing 
out from competition, embracing the mass app users, and adapting to platform’s changing 
technological and administrative policies. On the App Store, competition stays much 
closer to each other than on the web. Not only are apps organized according to categories, 
similar apps appear together after a user’s search. Therefore developers need to design 
app graphics and descriptions to quickly grab user’s attention. As noted earlier, the App 
Store has attracted a large number of users who have never made software purchase part 
of their lives, but it also brings new challenges to developers in tech support. Unlike 
power users who are familiar with third-party software experience, these new users 
exhibit certain “immature”behaviors. For instance, they would complain about features 
that developers do not claim to have or blame developers for issues they are not liable for, 
etc. Learning to interact with average users is thus a new task for developers. Besides 
close competition and average user support, platform’s changing policies also keep 
developers preoccupied. The Mac App Store removed much flexibility that developers 
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had enjoyed in app transactions with users on their web stores: the App Store licensing 
scheme makes sharing review and testing copies less easy; a commonly used time-limited 
demo approach by Mac indies is forbidden on the App Store; paid upgrades are not 
allowed on the App Store; user information is hidden from developers, so reaching 
customers is not straightforward. To accommodate these changes, developers employ
technical methods to address the licensing and app monetization challenges. They try to 
use in-app purchase through modular app design or new app release to solve the no-paid-
upgrade issue, but they both have limitations. Developers also attempt to communicate 
with users through app description or sway them onto their web stores, although the latter
bears the risk of app rejection. Besides, maintaining two customer bases and two app 
builds for the App Store and the web store adds burden to developers. Under the platform 
ecosystem logic, developers’ basis of strategy is “hit” growth (Qiu et al. 2012). The “hit”
here means striking app charts and constant new app releases. This is again mainly 
associated with design of the App Store and platform’s review process. Because ranking 
on top charts gives apps legitimacy and increases visibility, and sales volume determines 
chart position, developers tend to lower app prices and engage in pre-release buzz 
marketing in order to climb onto the chart during the initial launch. Writing apps with 
mass-appeal and modeling after or even mimicking store-trending apps is frequently 
pursued on the App Store, because this increases the chance for apps to hit the charts. The 
“hit”growth strategy is also related to platform’s review process. Since Apple evaluates 
apps after they are created, in order to minimize the risks of app rejection, developers 
release smaller-scale apps and save development cost. Consequently, developers diversify 
app portfolio with many small apps and accumulate profits from each of them. Having an 
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assortment of apps also taps into the new user group, who tend to be casual app 
consumers and view apps more like a form of entertainment rather than utility. Under the 
platform ecosystem logic, platform coordinates with developers mainly through formal 
mechanisms, namely, a pricing structure composed of membership fees and app royalty, 
and the technological, administrative and financial rules and regulations. Mac developers 
conveyed that the previously informal and personal exchange with Apple and Apple 
employees is disappearing. A seasoned Mac indie developer expressed his hope for a 
better communication on the App Store: “I’m hoping to see the Mac App Store developer 
experience evolve to encompass the needs of established Mac developers when it comes 
to providing the best possible service to our customers; having official channels so that 
developers can contact empowered App Store staff for customer-service issue escalation 
and resolution would be a great step.”
The above ideal-type attributes of platform ecosystem logic exhibit the effect of 
societal-level corporate and market logics. The corporate logic is manifested in 
developers’ increased reliance on the platform for technology and business needs. The
market logic is reflected in developers’ opportunities and incentives to function as a 
generalist company –in adoption of a “hit” strategy and embracing the mass users. Under 
platform ecosystem logic, Apple as the resource environment provides extensive rules 
and regulations on app qualification, licensing, monetization and versioning. These send 
a strong message of control and bureaucracy to Mac indie developers. Platform’s entry 
into developers’ distribution channel significantly alters the other part of developers’ 
resource environment –the market economy in which developers operate. Through 
bringing in large number of new users and developers, and a store design which favors 
90
frequent new app release, shorter development cycle and lower pricing, Apple creates a 
platform-controlled market environment, which denotes a very different kind of 
competition dynamics. These changes in the resource environment serve as a catalyst for 
incumbent Mac developers to redefine valuation of their software and labor, and their 
relationship with the platform. 
Logic evolution of incumbent Mac indie developers: a stakeholder view
In the previous section, I illustrate and contrast the ideal types of software ecosystem 
logic and platform ecosystem logic along the elemental categories before and after 
change in the resource environment: namely, platform’s governance change and the 
subsequent change in developers’ economy. As noted earlier, Mac developers’ platform 
ecosystem logic is composed of iOS-turned Mac developers’ practices and belief systems, 
and incumbent Mac developers’ changes in practices and belief systems in response to 
both the iOS App Store and the Mac App Store (MAS). In this section, I only focus on the 
incumbent Mac developers, and demonstrate how their logics shifted in a temporal 
structure using results of the content analysis based on Mac developers’ listserv 
discussion. As explained in the methods section, I divided the listserv discussion into 
three phases. While instances of platform ecosystem logic are already present in phase 1, 
they began to take shape in phase 2 and flourish in phase 3. Recall that a stakeholder 
perspective was adopted in the listserv threads coding. This approach allows me to 
observe which part of software logic changed meaning and morphed into platform logic 
due to platform’s governance change, and which part did not. In Table 4 through Table 8, 
themes are shown on developers’ relationship to three stakeholders: customers, the 
platform, and infrastructure providers, as well as their own entrepreneurial strategies,
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identity and routines. These themes are aggregated to top two levels from the original 
coding scheme in Table 11. Highlighted in yellow are the ones which changed meaning
or whose sub-theme(s) changed meaning. It is worth noting that certain category and 
themes did not take on meanings of platform ecosystem logic. For instance, meanings 
remained the same for themes in the category “developers’ relationship with 
infrastructure providers”. This is because platform Apple acts as a competitor to these 
services –it takes over their functionality with the App Store, rather than changing the 
way these services work. In addition, theme “3rd-party developers as modular to a system”
as part of developers’relationship with platform and “creation of an app other than 
coding” as part of developers’business operational routines were not affected by 
platform’s governance change either. Note that the kind of governance change I examine 
is platform’s entry into the marketplace domain. Hence, its impact is most salient in 
business-related themes, and less likely to occur on technology-related themes, albeit 
they also reflect developers’ business decisions. 
Table 9 shows the changing pattern of each of the five categories over time. With 
platform’s governance change, developers’discussion topics related to the platform and 
customers have increased significantly. This is mainly because platform’s new review
process, manifested in the sub-theme “Platform’s rules and regulations” under
“Platform’s coordination with developers”, and platform’s policies on apps’ versioning, 
upgrade and licensing, reflected in the theme “Versioning and upgrade”and “Licensing” 
attracted much of developers’ attention. In contrast, developers’discussions on 
infrastructure providers have reduced dramatically. This is not surprising, given most of 
the functionality is replaced with the App Store itself and developers’ dependency on 
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them is decreasing. Developers’ attention on entrepreneurial strategies, their identity and
business routines have roughly remained the same. An interesting observation is that 
from phase 1 to phase 3, developers’discussions on market environment and 
entrepreneurial strategies, as well as their identity and routines consistently exceeded 
those on other categories. It indicates that how to compete on the market, how to appraise 
oneself and behave in a community, and how to operate the business has always been 
developers’ top focus. The third-place changed from infrastructure service-related 
discussions in phase 1 to platform relationship in phase 3. It suggests that as the platform 
is involved in third-party applications’distribution, developers’attention towards the 
platform increased substantially.
Table 10 exhibits the changing distribution of software and platform logics over time 
in five categories. Except for relationship with infrastructure providers, which does not 
entail platform logic, other categories all witness a migration in discussion topics from 
software logic to platform logic due to platform’s governance change. Interestingly, in 
categories on relationship with the platform and customers, platform logic-related 
discussion significantly surpassed that on software logic and became dominant in 
developers’discussion in phase 3. In contrast, software logic still prevailed in phase 3 for 
developers’ discussion on market and strategies as well as their identity and business 
routines. To explain the latter phenomenon, let us recall that software logic in phase 2 and 
3 is composed of two types of discussions: issues related with developers’traditional 
distribution channel: the web store, or same set of issues also applicable to App Store 
apps. Percentage distribution among themes in these two categories in phase 3 
particularly suggests that “entrepreneurial decisions”, together with developers’
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operational routines, including “creation of apps other than coding” and “small business 
operations”, are what developers focus on the most regarding the web-store distribution 
issues. They are also less sensitive to platform governance change and are more likely to 
share in practices under two distinct distribution channels. The means across all 
categories shows that in phase 3, software ecosystem logic consists of close to 60% of 
developers’ entire listserv discussions, and platform ecosystem logic a little over than
40%. This suggests that the two logics co-exist with each other.
Dynamics between software ecosystem logic and platform ecosystem logic and 
platform’s organizational learning
In previous two sections, I contrast ideal types of software ecosystem logic and 
platform ecosystem logic, and show that they co-exist through an analysis of incumbent 
Mac developers’ listserv discussion. In this section, I argue that the two field-level logics 
are competing with each other by elucidating the conflicting points between their 
societal-level logic components. This analysis is based on the premise of the institutional 
logic theory that the interinstitutional logics in the society are interdependent and yet 
contradictory, each with differing belief systems and sources of rationality (Friedland and 
Alford 1991). Figure 4 provides a visual representation of the logic conflict. As discussed 
earlier, software ecosystem logic consists of professional logic and specialist market logic, 
and platform ecosystem logic comprises corporate logic and generalist market logic. I 
discuss their relationship according to the two dimensions of the platform ecosystem 
logic, as distinguished by the red and blue boxes in Figure 4. The first conflict between 
professional and corporate logic is manifested in developers’autonomy in making 
engineering and design decisions vs. platform’s control in these aspects. Professional 
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logic implies that Mac developers enjoy the freedom in using the kind of technology in 
writing apps, deciding how their programs behave and interact with other technology 
after installation or upon running, and tweaking native user interface elements, to name 
just a few. Corporate logic limits much of this freedom in that Apple as the platform 
exerts stringent control on these fronts through App Store review guidelines (Frakes, 
2010). What are business decisions to a platform is interpreted by developers as “politics”. 
Developers, who always like to resolve technical problems and “get things to work”, can 
accept that the platform has certain technical incompetence, but they are extremely 
frustrated by the administrative control or “politics” which they have no ways to fix. 
The other conflict between professional and corporate logic resides in developers’
professional orientation vs. platform’s consumer orientation. Apple’s sandboxing policy 
is the major trigger behind this conflict. Starting from June 1, 2012, when the operating 
system Mountain Lion was released, Apple mandated that new and significantly updated 
apps submitted to Apple’s Mac App Store must implement sandboxing. Sandboxing 
refers to “compartmentalizing what data and features a specific app is granted access to; 
apps each can metaphorically play exclusively in their own sandbox, accessing only that 
data which Apple has granted that app entitlements to see”(Friedman 2012). Sandboxing
is intended to enhance security, protecting Mac users from malware and poorly designed 
apps (Weatherhead 2012). This policy is consistent with Apple’s increasingly emphasized 
position as a consumer product company. Late CEO Steve Jobs described the company 
identity at Apple’s 4th-quarter earnings conference in 2010 by saying: “We’re a very 
high-volume consumer-electronics manufacturer. Consumer-electronics companies sell 
stuff to consumers. Consumers, well, consume. Once they’ve chosen their platform, they 
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predictably follow its guidance”(Myslewski 2010). This stance and its related policies 
contrast sharply with many Mac developers’identity as a power user and doer. Andy 
Ihnatko (2011) from the Macworld was concerned that sandboxing risks eroding the 
Mac’s identity. He strongly opined that “Mac users are doers, not consumers. The Mac 
must never, ever become a consumer product like the iPad, saddled with artificial 
limitations in the name of safety, reliability, and tidiness.”Sandboxing restricts what a 
program can do with the system, thus also limits how much a user can do with their Mac. 
Developers’ concern is that “the end result may be more safety for the average user, but at 
the cost of freedom –and advanced capabilities –for professional users” (Mogull 2012).
Moreover, for power users or other developer customers, sandboxing policy deprives
them with trust and confidence towards the Mac App Store as a market place to shop for 
apps. This is because certain apps they purchased before can no longer be updated, and 
hence caused them to lose software investments (Rentzsch and Pontious 2012). 
Regarding the conflict between specialist market logic and corporate logic, it is 
reflected in developers’autonomy in determining customer-facing and market positioning 
strategies vs. Apple’s control in them. As noted earlier, outside of the Mac App Store,
developers are free to set up trial and demo for their apps, be it time-limited or feature-
limited. They can charge for the upgrade to support continuous development, and design 
the licensing scheme for copy sharing, such as beta testing or app reviewing. The Mac 
App Store review guidelines explicitly prohibit all these flexibilities. In addition, while 
developers can acquire customer information for targeted marketing and troubleshooting
with apps sold through their web stores, Apple makes user information hidden with apps 
sold on the App Store, and thus makes developer-user communication much more 
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difficult. Furthermore, outside of the App Store, developers have the autonomy in 
designing marketing messages and positioning itself in relation to competition, be it other 
developers or the platform itself. However, Apple removes these rights from developers 
by including the following clauses in the review guidelines among others: “apps with 
metadata that mentions the name of any other computer platform will be rejected”; “apps 
that look similar to Apple Products or apps bundled on the Mac, including the Finder, 
iChat, iTunes, and Dashboard will be rejected”(Frakes 2010). Apple also disallows 
developers to mention the web-store version of the app in the MAS app description 
(Rentzsch et al. 2012), which essentially reduces users’chance of findings apps in 
alternative channels.
Now let us examine the second dimension of the platform ecosystem logic: generalist 
market logic. Its conflict with the professional logic is manifested in the different 
emphasis on app legitimacy. It is app quality as recognized by fellow developers, the 
platform and the users that the professional logic focuses on, whereas it is app ranking 
and users’reviews and ratings that the market logic underscores. With regard to conflict 
between specialist market logic and generalist market logic, it is demonstrated in the 
distinct approach on growth strategy. Under a specialist market logic, developers favors 
organic growth, while under a generalist market logic, developers turn to hit growth.
Compared with the level of conflict between generalist market logic and software 
ecosystem logic (the blue box in Figure 4), that between corporate logic and software 
ecosystem logic (the red box in Figure 4) is stronger for incumbent Mac developers and 
users. This is because the pressure from corporate logic is drastically different from the 
conventional way that Mac development is done, and it challenges developers’
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independence identity and their identification with the Mac and Apple in the old days. 
People lament that “the Mac App Store, for all intents and purposes, will bring an end to 
the rogue, piratical culture that Jobs once championed11”(Myslewski 2010).
Developers respond to the change of Mac development and Apple in different ways.
Some embrace the idea. It is almost unanimously agreed among developers that the Mac 
App Store brings better purchasing and maintenance experience for end users, not to 
mention the access to nearly all Mac users for indie developers. Developers report sales 
jump with the Mac App Store. Regarding platform’s tightened control mechanisms, some 
developers surrender. For instance, in order to meet sandboxing requirement, developers 
have to re-architect their apps or castrate features to continue to publish on the MAS, 
although they state that doing so costs time and effort, sacrifices user experience and 
damages developer reputation (Haslam 2012). Others resist. Some developers maintain a 
relatively high price range for apps sold on the Mac App Store, refusing a “race to the 
bottom” pricing strategy, therefore challenging the generalist market logic. Some 
developers consider leaving the MAS and only releasing apps in the traditional channel: 
their websites. Yet others propose a “pro” version of the App Store or open a community-
organized distribution channel as an alternative. Not only developers withdraw writing 
apps for the MAS, developer customers and power users abandon app consumption from 
there, too. Marco Arment, an influential iOS developer and a power user of Mac, warned 
that “the Mac App Store is in significant danger of becoming an irrelevant, low-traffic 
flea market where buyers rarely venture for serious purchases”(Arment 2012). Similarly, 
Neven Mrgan, designer at a well-known Mac indie shop: Panic, was also concerned about 
the future of the MAS: “the loss of casual users to iOS, and the loss of non-casual apps 
                                                          
11 “Why join the navy if you can be a pirate?” –Steve Jobs 1983.
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on the (Mac) App Store— and it starts to look like a problem” (Mrgan 2012). A collective 
sentiment among the incumbent Mac indie community towards policies such as 
sandboxing is that “it will create a lose-lose-lose situation for Apple, the developers and 
the users”(Haslam, 2012). Yet others, frustrated by the whole process, even decided to 
quit Mac development completely or transition to Linux. Developers shared the following 
sentiment on the listserv discussions:
“With the announcement of the Mac App Store, Apple has broken any lingering hope 
I had for one day succeeding at indie Mac development. Being treated as a responsible 
adult, innovating without restriction, connecting directly with customers, and being able 
to fix my mistakes quickly — the things I cherished most about my job at CT — are being 
gradually replaced by a “submission” process.”
“I’ve been a Mac developer for many years now. Over the years I’ve seen countless 
technologies pass by. I’ve enjoyed seeing Apple in good times, and I’ve been with them in 
bad times. I’ve seen people at Apple come and I’ve seen them leave. And I’ve stayed 
because I love what I’m doing. But it’s getting harder to love Apple. It’s not only the 
constant NDA’s. I’m tired of filing bug reports that don’t get fixed for months or years for 
things that I could probably have fixed myself over a few days. I had moved completely to 
Cocoa at the time but I can understand how the Carbon developers felt after basically 
being left in the cold over a night. The slow response to the DigiNotar incident. HFS+ 
corruptions. WWDC. Section 3.3.1. App Store. I want out of it.”
In addition to identifying the conflict between the software ecosystem logic and 
platform ecosystem logic, the data revealed that organizational learning (Levitt and 
March 1988, Huber 1991) of one of developers’ resource environments: the platform 
exacerbates these conflicts for incumbent Mac developers. For platform Apple, this 
organizational learning comprises of two parts: continuous adoption of a centralized 
distribution channel and learning by doing. The former led to a misfit between platform’s 
governance model and third-party developers’conventional practices. The latter caused 
great uncertainty among developers and users, and reduced their motivation in using the 
platform. If we were to trace the origin of the current Mac App Store, it is a carbon copy 
of the iOS App Store, and the iOS App Store is adapted from Apple’s iTunes music 
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store12. Although the iOS App Store also attracts many complaints from developers due to 
Apple’s rules and associated market dynamics, “its restrictions work for the most part, 
because the platform has grown around them. They mostly don’t get in the way”(Marco 
Arment, in Friedman 2012). However, it became an issue when Apple was aiming to use 
the iOS App Store model, minimally changed, for the Mac App Store (Frakes 2010). 
Marco once again opined that “the App Store policies are being retrofitted into a well-
established environment that they’re fairly incompatible with”(in Friedman 2012). In
addition to grafting a new model to an existing market, platform’s learning by doing also 
deepens the logic conflict for Mac developers. Apple adjusts policies based on feedback 
from the market over time. While learning is common for any type of organization, the 
consequence of a platform’s learning could be damaging for third-party complementors. 
Apple’s learning by doing means that the timing of their many policies towards 
developers is after the fact, i.e., Apple pulls apps after they are published, or requires
apps to be modified architecturally after they are completed. Such policy changes of 
Apple result in developers’waste in development and marketing effort, or users’loss in 
software investment, not to mention Apple is known for changing policies without 
informing its developers. All these have led to great uncertainty among developers and 
power users, and caused people to lose trust in the platform.
                                                          
12 Following Sprigman (2006), I illustrate the shared attributes between the iTunes music store and the iOS 
App Store as follows. First, in both cases, Apple dominates one side of the two-sided networks –the 
hardware sales market, and uses this to negotiate terms with content providers (in iTunes, it is the Big 4 
music label companies, and in the iOS App Store, it is developers). Second, both stores create a “des-
intermediation”model, which directly connects consumers with content. Third, Apple adopts the same 
30/70 revenue split model with content providers. Fourth, the iOS App Store adopts the “top charts”and 
“hit”feature from the iTunes store. For one thing, the iTunes “re-empowers”singles (du Lac 2006), but it 
also reinforces the “hit”mentality for both the music industry and consumers. This is extended to the iOS 
App Store for software production and consumption. Developers refer to this as “pop software”model 
(Rentzsch et al. 2012).  
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Discussion and conclusion
This study set out to investigate the relationship between resource environments and 
field-level logic in the context of independent software developers of Apple’s desktop 
platform (Mac indies). Following the cultural emergence model of field-level logics in
Thornton et al. (2012), I attempt to answer three research questions: how do resource 
environments lead to the emergence of field-level logic of independent Mac developers? 
How do changes in resource environments impact third-party developers’ institutional 
logic? And what are the dynamics between the incumbent logic and the new logic of 
third-party Mac developers and how do resource environments impact such dynamics?
The findings reveal that two layers of resource environments are present for third-party 
developers given the structure of platform-oriented software industry: the platform 
governance pattern and developers’own economy. Both of them influence developers’
logic through material practices and symbolic meanings. In addition, developers’
economic environment is also affected by platform’s governance. Exploiting a critical 
change of the resource environment –Apple extending the role from a technology 
platform to a market exchange owner, and through a narrative and content analysis, I 
show that a software ecosystem logic prevailed prior to the change, while a new logic: 
platform ecosystem logic emerged afterwards. Constructing the ideal types of the two 
logics via a stakeholder perspective, I demonstrate that these two field-level logics are 
both combinations of societal-level logics, and are also subject to the distinct processes of 
the software industry. Software ecosystem logic is a hybrid of professional and market 
logic, and platform ecosystem logic is a hybridization of corporate and market logic. As 
the platform expands its governance territory and tightens its rules and regulations over 
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developers, developers’practices towards and interpretations of platform’s role and their 
own economic environment change as well. These changes are manifested in the 
elemental categories of the ideal types of the two logics. A content analysis of incumbent 
Mac indies’ discussion also illustrates the temporal logic shift pattern evidenced in the 
changing field-level practices and symbolic meanings. Furthermore, a discussion of
societal-level logics’ conflict shows that Mac indies’incumbent and new logics are still in 
contestation with each other at this stage. Moreover, platform as part of the resource 
environments intensifies such contestation due to its organizational learning process. 
This study contributes to the institutional logic theory mainly through a validation of 
the theoretical model of field level logics in Thornton et al. (2012). I specifically 
explicate the role of resource environments and societal level logics on the formation and 
dynamics of field-level logics. In accord with the dual view of institutional logic theory, I 
illustrate both the material and symbolic aspect of Mac indie’s logic through analyzing 
the discourse of developers and trade press. This study also contributes to the literature on 
software platform governance by emphasizing the role of developers in the ecosystem. I 
position developers as institutional actors, who interpret and make meanings of 
platform’s governance mechanisms and their change. This adds a fresh perspective on the 
extant platform ecosystem literature, which tends to focus on the platform itself, or 
merely treat developers as an ancillary component in the platform ecosystem competition. 
In this study I examine one platform and hence am able to integrate discussion of 
platform governance together with developers’ reactions and interpretations. This study 
also contributes to the emerging literature on platform’s non-pricing governance 
mechanisms (e.g. Boudreau and Hagiu 2009, Hagiu 2009), by systematically 
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demonstrating the rules and regulations of a technology platform-turned market exchange 
owner. For Apple, certain non-technology policies are to secure its role as a market 
exchange owner. In the meantime, it also issues technology-related policies not for 
technology’s sake; rather, they are designed to protect the interests of one side of the two-
sided networks –consumers’, although these policies can hurt interests of developers, the 
other critical part in a two-sided network. This also reveals another trade-off for 
platforms –the balance between consumers’ interests and developers’ interests, in 
addition to the classic trade-off frequently discussed in the literature –that between value 
creation and value appropriation when considering platform’s technology openness. 
This study has several practical implications. It indicates that it is crucial for a 
platform to develop better understanding about third-party developers, especially about 
where they come from. For Apple, they face the risk of losing incumbent Mac indie 
developers on the Mac App Store because its technology policies inconvenience this 
group of developers. Apple can try to find a midpoint which can both protect users’ 
interests and accommodate developers’ needs. For a technology platform transitioning to 
becoming a market exchange owner, it is also critical to spend more energy in designing 
better store experience to facilitate buyer-seller transaction. For instance, lack of direct 
communication between developers and users has been complained about by developers 
for a long time. Apple could design mechanisms to enhance such communication 
experience while retaining its control as a platform. This study can also help further 
developers’ understanding about their own practices and meaning system. Cultural 
anthropologists argue that “many of the cultural ideas and standards for interpretation 
which guide the ways in which people ascribe meaning are not well understood by the 
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people who use them… One of the great contributions of the cultural perspective has been 
to uncover the more tacit dimensions of human thought and to demonstrate how these 
hidden grammars of meaning help shape our lives” (Chambers 1985: p5). While this 
study is not ethnography per se, it does expose the underlying meaning system of 
developers, which might not be obvious to developers themselves. 
This study has several limitations. First is regarding the causality inference of 
developers’discussion topic shift in the content analysis. I suggest that the shift in 
developers’practices and meaning system is due to platform’s governance change; and 
yet the method used for the content analysis cannot rule out alternative explanations. For 
instance, discussion topics could be related to the type of people who post messages, the 
list guidelines enforced by the list moderator, the auto-correlation among threads topics, 
etc. However, the goal of the content analysis is not to argue for causality; rather, it is to 
demonstrate a general trend in the changing pattern of the two logics. Secondly, I only 
coded the first message in a thread and this could leave out certain dynamics within a 
given thread. This is less of an issue for the ideal type construction, because of the use of 
supplemental data sources. However, this could potentially influence the results of the 
content analysis, although I try to mitigate this limitation with the large number of 
threads coded. 
This study suggests several directions for future research. First of all, given unique 
attributes of each platform and their governance mechanisms, it would be interesting to 
examine the resource environment in other software platforms or technology platforms 
which also incorporate a distribution channel in their governance model, and the impact 
of the resource environment on third-party developers’institutional logic. For instance, 
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Google and Microsoft, while both adopt a similar “app store”approach, have policies 
which differ significantly from each other and from Apple. The implications that these 
governance policies have on developers’economy, and consequently their practices and 
meaning systems would be interesting to study. Secondly, in this study we focus on 
small-scale independent third-party developers because of characteristics of Apple, for 
whom indie developers constitute a major component of the third-party developer base. 
For platforms such as Microsoft, their developers exhibit different firm size and scope 
compared with Mac indies. How these developers’institutional logic emerges and 
changes in relation to their resource environment would also be interesting to examine. 
Last but not the least, it is argued that “the conceptual scheme of the ideal types offers a 
guide for developing hypotheses about the effects of institutional change on the attributes 
likely to affect the dependent variables of interest”(Thornton 2004: 25). Thus, the ideal 
types derived in this study can potentially be developed into hypotheses about Mac indie 
developers and demonstrate that the effect on dependent variables of interest is 
institutionally contingent. 
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Figure 1a. Cultural emergence model of field-level institutional logics in Thornton, 
Ocasio and Lounsbury (2012: 151)
Figure 1b. Relationships examined in the current study
Resource 
environment
Material + symbolic 
characteristics 
Field-level logics





Table 1. Data sources and analytical process
Data sources and analytical 
process
Explanations
1. Time frame of interest on Mac 
indies’ institutional logic
2001-2012
2. General data sources Publicly available online data sources; existing 
studies on Mac indies and iOS developers. 
Most data sources cover 2004 to 2012; an 
ethnographic study on Mac indies by Meeteren 
(2008) and an oral history project on Mac 
culture provide data between 2001 and 2004
3. General analytical approach Qualitative study with interpretive philosophy; 
combination of narrative (ideal types of 
institutional logic) and content analysis 
(shifting pattern of institutional logic); 
analyzing the relationship between the 
societal-level logics to elucidate the dynamics 
between the two logics at the field level
4. Ideal type construction of institutional logics and characteristics of resource 
environment 
4.1.  Elemental categories of ideal 
types
From existing institutional logic studies
4.2.  Data sources for the incumbent 
logic
Data sources on incumbent Mac developers, 
Mac culture and existing research on Mac 
indies (e.g. Meeteren 2008) 
4.3.  Data sources for the new logic Data sources on incumbent Mac developers’ 
changes, iOS-turned Mac developers, and 
existing studies on iOS developers 
4.4.  Qualitative coding: started with 
discussion topic of MacSB on 
Yahoo! Group
Divided listserv threads into 3 time periods in 
accord with Apple’s governance change
4.4.1. General coding 
framework 
Used stakeholder perspective to map the 
comprehensiveness of the elemental categories 
and to explicate characteristics of the resource 
environment; 5 categories emerged
4.4.2. Combination of deductive 
and inductive coding approach
Relevant literature: platform governance, Mac 
indies and iOS developers
4.4.3. Guiding principle of logic 
change coding 
Used themes generated in the 1st phase as a 
baseline; any new meanings attached to the 
existing themes or brand new themes were 
classified as the new institutional logic 
attributed to the platform governance change. 
Two themes related to new logic also present 
in phase 1
4.4.4. Coding approach Followed Strauss and Corbin’s approach 
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(1998): open coding, axial coding and selective 
coding. Extensive memos taken during coding 
process
4.4.5. Inter-coder reliability Cohen’s kappa is 0.75
4.4.6. Complete coding scheme 
generated 
Table 11
4.5.   Qualitative coding: 
continued with supplemental online 
archival sources
Used snowball and theoretical sampling to 
obtain 77 pieces of text 
4.5.1. Coding of supplemental 
online archival sources
Used same coding scheme from the listserv 
discussion
4.5.2. New theme emerged: 
“platform organizational 
learning”
Obtained additional 6 pieces of text on Apple’s 
iTunes
4.6.    Mapping coding scheme 
and existing studies with elemental 
categories of ideal types
Elemental categories for a changed theme do 
not have to be the same 
5. Content analysis Used results from listserv discussion coding to 
quantitatively show incumbent Mac 
developers’ temporal shift in logics 
5.1. Change of distribution of two 
logics in each category over time 
Percentage score calculated




Table 2a. “Revised Interinstitutional System Ideal Types”in Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury (2012: 73)
Y-Axis: X-Axis: Institutional Orders
Categories Family 1 Community 2 Religion 3 State 4 Market 5 Profession 6 Corporation 
7
Root Metaphor 1 Family as firm Common 
boundary
Temple as bank State as 
redistributio
n mechanism
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Table 2b. “Ideal types of institutional logics in architecture”in Thornton, Jones and Kury 
(2005: 144)
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Figure 2. Stakeholder-view as a general coding framework. This figure depicts how 
resource environment affects developers’ relationship with their stakeholders and their 
own identities and practices. In oval shapes are developers’ relationships with 
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Two ideal types of Mac developers’ institutional logics
Characteristics Software ecosystem logic Platform ecosystem logic
Societal-level logics  Market (specialist) and 
Profession
 Market (generalist) and 
corporation
Economic system  Market capitalism and personal 
capitalism
 Market capitalism and 
managerial capitalism
Sources of identity  Independent third-party 
developer entrepreneur 
 Subordinate third-party 
developer entrepreneur 
Sources of legitimacy  Quality of apps 
 Reputation of developer 
 Platform recognition via awards 
 Chart ranking of apps 
 Platform recognition via
featuring 
 End users’ reviews and ratings
Sources of authority  Software engineering and design 
prowess 
 Market acceptance
 Platform’s review process 
 End user interests
Basis of norms  Membership in community of 
practice 
 Self-interest
 Dependency on the platform
Basis of mission  Build sustainable business 
 Increase sales
 Build competitive position of 
apps 
 Build apps to be favored by 
the platform
Basis of attention  Resolve entrepreneurial 
challenges 
 Implement infrastructure best 
suited for the business 
 Adapt to platform’s system 
progress and technology change 
 Stand out in competition 
 Embrace the mass app users 
 Adapt to platform’s changing 
technological and 
administrative policies 
Basis of strategy  Organic growth  “Hit” growth 
Platform-developer 
coordination
 Productive programming 
environment
 Culture and affective 
attractiveness of the platform 
 Platform’s formal and informal 
relationship with developers 
 Legal rules 
 Pricing 
 Platform rules and regulations
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Figure 3. The material and symbolic aspects of resource environment in two institutional logics of Mac developers. There are two 
layers of resource environment in each logic. Platform influences the customer base of developers’ economy in software ecosystem 
logic, and it influences the entire developers’ economy in the platform ecosystem logic. 







tools and design 
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Table 4. Coding on “relationship with customers”
Percentage of customer 







Software logic Software logic Platform logic Software logic Platform logic
COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT %
Total coding incidents 












8 14.04% 3 30.00% 1 16.67% 18 69.23%




6 75.00% 1 33.33% 1 100.00% 6 33.33%
     Upgrade 2 8.00% 1 12.50% 2 66.67% 0 0.00% 4 22.22%
     Versioning 1 4.00% 1 12.50% 0 0.00%
     Multi-channel 
management 0 0.00% 8 44.44%
h
User licensing 28 31.82% 17 29.82% 3 30.00% 0 0.00% 2 7.69%
Tech support 35 39.77% 32 56.14% 4 40.00% 5 83.33% 6 23.08%
     Support challenges 
and approach 5 14.29% 9 28.13% 2 50.00% 4 80.00% 4 66.67%
     Handling difficult 
customers 8 22.86% 3 9.38% 2 50.00% 1 20.00% 2 33.33%
     Handling refund 6 17.14% 4 12.50% 0 0.00%
     Tools for support or 
feedback 16 45.71% 16 50.00% 0 0.00%
a Highlighted in yellow are the themes whose meaning changed in the platform ecosystem logic compared to the software 
ecosystem logic.
b Phase 1: prior to announcement of iOS App Store; phase 2: after announcement of iOS App Store and prior to announcement 
of Mac App Store; phase 3: after announcement of Mac App Store
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c In phase 1, 11.35% of developers’ total discussions on the listserv is on relationship with customers. 
d “COUNT”denotes number of incidents coded. In phase 1, 88 incidents were about relationship with customers 
e Among all discussions on relationship with customers, 28.41% are about “versioning and upgrade”
f Among all “versioning and upgrade” codes, 88.00% are on “Trial / demo”
g In phase 2, 85.07% of all discussions on relationship with customers reflect software ecosystem logic, and 14.93% reflect 
platform ecosystem logic
h “Multi-channel management” is a brand new sub-theme for platform ecosystem logic; it consists of 44.44% of “versioning 
and upgrade” in phase 3
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Table 5. Coding on “relationship with platform Apple”
Percentage of platform 
incidents in each phase PHASE 1 11.35% PHASE 2 11.31% PHASE 3 21.35%
Software logic Software logic Platform logic Software logic Platform logic
COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT %
Total coding incidents of 
platform per phase per 
logic 88 100.00% 43 74.14% 15 25.86% 10 24.39% 31 75.61%
Themes
3rd-party developers as 
modular to a system 29 32.95% 12 27.91% 0.00% 6 60.00% 0.00%
    Developers’ decisions on 
OS compatibility or choice 
of development machines 18 62.07% 7 58.33% 0.00% 6 100.00% 0.00%
     Impact of platform 
technology transition on 
devs 11 37.93% 2 16.67% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
     Impact of platform’s 
clone machine on devs 0 0.00% 1 8.33% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
     Impact of platform’s UI 
or technology design on 
devs 0 0.00% 2 16.67% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
Strategic relationship 
between platform and 3rd-
party developers 27 30.68% 19 44.19% 7 46.67% 2 20.00% 5 16.13%
     Platform’s entry into 
developers’ turf 6 22.22% 1 5.26% 2 28.57% 0 0.00% 2 40.00%
     Developers’ reliance on 
platform’s installed base 11 40.74% 5 26.32% 5 71.43% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
     Platform assisting 
developers’ marketing 10 37.04% 13 68.42% 0 0.00% 2 100.00% 3 60.00%
Platform’s coordination 
with developers 32 36.36% 12 27.91% 8 53.33% 2 20.00% 26 83.87%
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     Platform’s formal 
developer relationship 
program 13 40.63% 4 33.33% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.00%
     Platform’s rules and 
regulations 11 34.38% 5 41.67% 8 100.00% 0 0.00% 26 100.00%
     Platform’s cultural 
influence on developers 8 25.00% 3 25.00% 0.00% 2 100.00% 0.00%
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Table 6. Coding on “relationship with infrastructure service providers”
Percentage of infrastructure 
incidents in each phase PHASE 1 13.68% PHASE 2 11.89% PHASE 3 6.77%
Software logic Software logic Platform logic Software logic Platform logic
COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT %
Total coding incidents of 
infrastructure per phase per 
logic 106 100.00% 60 100.00% N/A N/A 12 100.00% N/A N/A
Themes
App aggregators 20 18.87% 10 16.67% N/A N/A 5 41.67% N/A N/A
Payment or e-commerce 
services 67 63.21% 39 65.00% N/A N/A 4 33.33% N/A N/A
Hosting services 13 12.26% 7 11.67% N/A N/A 3 25.00% N/A N/A
Auto update services 5 4.72% 4 6.67% N/A N/A 0 0.00% N/A N/A
Software publishing services 1 0.94% 0 0.00% N/A N/A 0 0.00% N/A N/A
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Table 7. Coding on “market competition / indie business strategies”
Percentage of market / 
strategy incidents in each 
phase PHASE 1  34.45% PHASE 2  37.04% PHASE 3  30.73%
Software logic Software logic Platform logic Software logic Platform logic
COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT %
Total coding incidents of 
market / strategy per 
phase per logic 262 98.13% 5 1.87% 183 96.32% 7 3.68% 43 72.88% 16 27.12%
Themes
External environment 38 14.50% 17 9.29% 3 42.86% 2 4.65% 2 12.50%
     Dealing with piracy 26 68.42% 0 0.00% 14 82.35% 0 0.00% 2 100.00% 1 50.00%
     Product, platform 
competition and competitors 9 23.68% 0 0.00% 3 17.65% 2 66.67% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
     Core customer base 
identification 3 7.89% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 33.33% 0 0.00% 1 50.00%
Entrepreneurial decisions 224 85.50% 5 100.00% 166 90.71% 4 57.14% 41 95.35% 14 87.50%
     Platform choice (multi-
homing) 8 3.57% 6 3.61% 3 7.32%
     Revenue and licensing 
model choice 15 6.70% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
     Pricing strategy 30 13.39% 0 0.00% 13 7.83% 3 75.00% 1 2.44% 8 57.14%
     App product strategy 15 6.70% 3 60.00% 14 8.43% 1 25.00% 0 0.00% 1 7.14%
     App releasing strategy 14 6.25% 2 40.00% 3 1.81% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 7.14%
     Marketing and PR 
strategy 117 52.23% 0 0.00% 102 61.45% 0 0.00% 33 80.49% 4 28.57%
     Business expansion or 
discontinuance, alternative 
entrepreneurial options 25 11.16% 28 16.87% 4 9.76%
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Table 8. Coding on “developers’ identity and business routines”
Percentage of identity / routine 
incidents in each phase PHASE 1 29.16% PHASE 2 26.90% PHASE 3 25.00%
Software logic Software logic Platform logic Software logic Platform logic
COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT %
Total coding incidents of identity
/ routine per phase per logic 226 100.00% 130 94.20% 8 5.80% 34 70.83% 14 29.17%
Themes
Identity of an indie app 
entrepreneur 108 47.79% 43 33.08% 4 50.00% 7 20.59% 9 64.29%
     Individual-level identity 45 41.67% 23 53.49% 2 50.00% 2 28.57% 6 66.67%
     Collective identity in a 
community of practice 63 58.33% 20 46.51% 2 50.00% 5 71.43% 3 33.33%
Creation of apps other than 
coding 53 23.45% 36 27.69% 11 32.35%
     Documentation or technical 
writing resources 10 18.87% 6 16.67% 0 0.00%
     App build choice 8 15.09% 2 5.56% 1 9.09%
     Beta testing resources 8 15.09% 7 19.44% 3 27.27%
     Aesthetic touch of the app or 
website 19 35.85% 16 44.44% 6 54.55%
     User experience consideration 
in app design 8 15.09% 5 13.89% 1 9.09%
Small business operation 65 28.76% 51 39.23% 4 50.00% 16 47.06% 5 35.71%
     Financial operations 21 32.31% 16 31.37% 2 50.00% 5 31.25% 1 20.00%
     Legal issues 31 47.69% 24 47.06% 2 50.00% 9 56.25% 4 80.00%
     Administrative process 13 20.00% 11 21.57% 2 12.50%
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Table 9. Changing pattern of each stakeholder category over time. Phase 1: prior to announcement of iOS App Store; Phase 2: 
after announcement of iOS App Store and prior to announcement of Mac App Store; Phase 3: after announcement of Mac App 
Store
Categories PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3
Percentage of platform 
incidents 11.35% 11.31% 21.35%
Percentage of customer 
incidents 11.35% 13.06% 16.67%
Percentage of infrastructure 
incidents 13.68% 11.70% 6.25%
Percentage of market / 
strategy incidents 34.45% 37.04% 30.73%
Percentage of identity / 
routine incidents 29.16% 26.90% 25.00%
Total 99.99% 100.01% 100.00%
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Table 10. Changing distribution of software and platform logics in each stakeholder category over time
PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3
Software logic Platform logic Software logic Platform logic Software logic Platform logic
Categories COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT % COUNT %
Developers’
relationship 













and strategies 262 98.13% 5 1.87% 183 96.32% 7 3.68% 43 72.88% 16 27.12%
Developers’
identity and 
routines 226 100.00% 0 0.00% 130 94.20% 8 3.16% 34 70.83% 14 29.17%
Mean 99.63% 0.37% 89.95% 9.53% 57.37% 42.63%
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Figure 4. Conflict between software ecosystem logic and platform ecosystem logic for 




Professional logic Specialist market logic
Corporate logic
Conflict in autonomy vs. 





Conflict in autonomy vs. 
control in customer-
facing and market 
positioning strategies 
Generalist market logic
Conflict in app legitimacy:
quality vs. ranking




 Continuous adoption of a 
centralized distribution channel 
 Learning by doing 
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Table 11. Coding scheme developed from the MacSB listserv and applied in 
supplemental data sources to capture developers’ institutional logics before and after 
platform’s governance change. Highlighted in yellow are the themes whose meaning 
changed or whose sub-themes’meaning changed in the platform ecosystem logic 
compared to the software ecosystem logic. New meanings are included in the “platform 
ecosystem logic” column. Theme “Multi-channel management” only appeared in the 
platform ecosystem logic. Highlighted in blue are the elemental categories of the ideal 
types –this indicates the mapping between themes developed according to the 
stakeholder framework and elemental categories of the ideal types. It is worth noting that 
when a theme of software ecosystem logic changed meaning in the platform ecosystem 
logic, its corresponding elemental category of the ideal types could change, too. For 
instance, for the sub-theme “Technical requirement adherence” under “Platform’s 
coordination with developers”, it belongs to the elemental category “Platform-developer 
coordination”in the software ecosystem logic, and “Sources of authority” in the platform 
ecosystem logic.
Software ecosystem logic Platform ecosystem 
logic
Relationship with platform Apple 
1. 3rd-party development as modular component to a 
system (Basis of attention)
a. Developers’ decisions on OS compatibility or 
choice of development machines 
b. Impact of platform technology transition on 
developers
c. Impact of platform’s clone machines on 
developers
d. Impact of platform’s UI or technology (OS) 
design on developers
2. Strategic relationship between platform and 3rd-party 
devs
a. Platform’s entry into developers’ turf: product 
market clash (Sources of identity)
Distribution channel 
clash (Sources of 
identity)
b. Developers’ reliance on platform’s installed base
(relevant discussions on platform hardware 






for the up-and-coming 
mobile platform of the 
company) (Sources of 
identity)
c. Platform assisting developers’ marketing: devs Platform featuring on 
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listing apps on Apple download.com; Apple 





3. Platform’s coordination with developers 
a. Platform’s formal developer relationship 
program: ADC (Apple Developer Connection), 
WWDC and platform’s privileged developer 
relationship program: ADA (Platform-developer 
coordination)
b. Platform’s rules and regulations (Platform-
developer coordination)
i. Legal aspect related to the platform: use 
of platform’s graphic assets / Apple’s 








ii. Technical requirement adherence App Store review 
guidelines (Sources of 
authority)
c. Platform’s cultural influence on developers: 
definition of a good product by Mac standards; 
impact of platform design philosophy on 3rd-
party’s design in icon, UI, and websites
(Sources of legitimacy)
     
Market or competition / indie business strategies
1. External environment 
a. Piracy concerns / issue /  overcome strategies
(reaction: upset to happy; strategy: blocking to 
not bother) (Basis of attention)





b. Product, platform competition or competitor 
type (Basis of attention)
New devs tend to not 





c. Core customer base identification (who are they: 
power users or average users) (Economic 
system)
Leisure users, viewing 
apps more like a form 
of entertainment rather 
than utility (Economic 
system; Basis of 
strategy)
2. Entrepreneurial decisions (Basis of attention)
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a. Platform choice (multi-homing): web vs. native 
debate; cross-platform development
b. Revenue / licensing model choice (source code: 
open vs. closed source; payment options: 
commercial vs. free; voluntary pay (donation 
ware) vs. pay-after-trial (shareware))
i. OSS and free vs. commercialized / 
shareware OSS
ii. Closed source free vs. closed source 
commercial / shareware
iii. Shareware vs. donationware vs. freeware 
c. Pricing strategy (Basis of strategy) i. Low pricing related 
to top charts and store 
trend; (Basis of 
strategy)
ii. Strong Price 
elasticity (Basis of 
strategy)
i. General question about determining 
price on an app
ii. Pricing related to perceived customer 
reaction 
iii. Pricing related to support cost
iv. Upgrade pricing
v. Pricing based on competition
vi. Price related to the macro-economy, i.e., 
inflation
d. App product strategy (Basis of strategy)
i. App market identification  




sales of small apps)
(Basis of strategy)
iii. Degree of synthesis
1. Synthesis in ideation
2. Synthesis in execution
e. App releasing strategy (Basis of strategy)
i. Optimal release timing 
ii. Releasing drama creation (buzz first or 
product first; secrecy or openness with 
the press) 
iii. Frequent releasing strategy (for 
marketing coordination or obtaining 
feedback)
Frequent releasing






f. Marketing and PR strategy i. Strategies on 
ranking, charting; 
attracting more 
and positive user 
reviews; 
competing for user 
attention (Basis of 
legitimacy)
i. General marketing approach or questions
ii. Word of mouth marketing: PR services / 
PR release strategies & Review site / 
bloggers / “High-status dev”/ MUG 
(Mac user group) / user reviews
iii. Online advertising
iv. Relationship building with customers; 
social networking sites
v. Affiliate marketing & advertising 
revenue
vi. Price promotions / discounts
vii. Branding / product or company image 
building
1. General branding 
2. Product-centric or company-
centric marketing
3. Naming: naming the app, 
company, domain, or version
viii. Marketing tools in connecting with 
customers
1. Customer info management / 
CRM 
2. Virtual telephone service 
3. Teasing feature
4. Blogging software 
5. Screencaster service
6. Email marketing tools
7. SEO & Web analytics
ix. Distribution channel options (options 
contrasting to the App Store model; 
questions / pros and cons): i.e., physical
CD; site licenses / family pack; retail 
store; MacWorld Expo; resellers; 
magazine; bundled sales (i.e., MacZot)
g. Business expansion or discontinuance, 
alternative business options for indie 
i. Business acquisition 
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ii. Localization and internationalization
iii. Selling business or apps
iv. Product or old version discontinue
v. Indie contract work or consulting
vi. Custom development for client
Relationship with customers (Basis of attention)
1. Shareware versioning
a. Trial / Demo: time limited vs. feature limited; 
Pros and Cons about design issue
Trial mode change: 
no time-limited demo
(Basis of attention)
b. Upgrade: design of upgrade policy Upgrade process 
change: no paid 
upgrades (Basis of 
attention)




2. User licensing; licensing scheme design; market 
segment validation; product activation; distributing 
testing / reviewer copies
Licensing scheme 
changed: sharing 
testing / reviewer 
copies becomes less 
easy (Basis of 
attention)
3. Tech support
a. Indie developers’ support challenges and 
approach (support norm / philosophy; 





with users, so 
developers had to 
come up with 
alternative ways for 
support (Basis of 
attention)
b. Handling difficult customers (dealing with 
negative user reviews)
“Immature”user 
behavior (Basis of 
attention)
c. Handling refund 
d. Tools for user support or feedback
i. Tools in general
ii. Bug / support / crash / feature request / 
report tracking system 
iii. Forum tools 
iv. Mailinglist management service 
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Relationship with infrastructure service providers (Basis of 
attention)
1. App aggregators (i.e., MacUpdate, Version Tracker, 
Apple download, CNET download; Bodega) 
2. Payment, e-commerce or licensing services providers 
(i.e., Kagi, eSellerate, Paypal; AquaticPrime, etc.)
3. Hosting services (including email service / server) 
4. Auto update services: Sparkle 
5. Software publishing services 
Developers’ identity and business routines
1. Identity of an indie app entrepreneur
a. Individual-level identity
i. Independence: bootstrapping business 
instead of taking external funds; 
independence from working for others; 
independence from a large corporation 
or large player in the industry; freedom 
in choosing the kind of technology to 
use; regarding the term “sharecropper”, 
it means the potential risk of “product 
clashing” with platform offerings 
(Sources of identity)
Decreased level of 
independence: 
welcoming the idea 
of App Store or 




need to follow the 
technical and 
administrative rules 
and regulations from 
the platform (Sources 
of identity)
ii. Life-work balance / sustainability / day 
job-indie balance (Basis of mission)
iii. Norms or ethics of being an indie or a 
software developer (Basis of norms)
iv. Going indie (how to start out) / new 
product announcement / achievement 
announcement (Basis of mission)
b. Collective identity (Basis of norms)
i. Developer-collaboration / Co-op effort





ii. Knowledge resource or information 
sharing
iii. Etiquette in treating competitors in the 
Mac business world
iv. Sales pattern sharing / analysis to 
stimulate discussions on the list 
App Store sales 
pattern analysis: 
comparing with the 
web store sales (Basis 
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of attention)
2. Creation of the app itself other than the coding part
(Sources of legitimacy)
a. Documentation or technical writing resources
b. App build choice: i.e., DiskImage or Zip
c. Beta testing resources
d. Aesthetic touch of the app / website
i. Designer or design software choice
ii. Audio engineer
iii. Website building and management tools
e. User experience design 
3. Small business operation (Basis of attention)







i. Cost of ISV / financial matters
ii. Insurance: health insurance / property 
insurance 
iii. Product tax-related or banking issues
iv. Accounting software / accountant / 
payroll software 
b. Legal issues i. Requirement 
from authority 












i. General legal inquiry (copyright; 
incorporation)
ii. Business structure / entity (incorporation 
/ LLC / sole proprietorship)
iii. Business liability
1. Product liability insurance / 
merchant account 
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2. Liability in promotion activities
3. EULA / legalese / privacy policy 
4. Backup strategy / code escrow
iv. Existing or potential legal dispute: 
Trademark / app (company) naming 
collision / copyright / clone; legal fight
v. OSS licensing (using or licensing under 
OSS licenses)
vi. Potential legal conflict between day job 
and moonlighting job 
c. Administrative process
i. Formalizing business process (i.e., 
checklist, formal business plan, 
certification)
ii. Personnel structure
iii. Project management tools / time tracking 
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